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ANGUS A. MacINTYRE*

Why Pesticides Received Extensive
Use in America: A Political
Economy of Agricultural Pest
Management to 1970**
ABSTRACT
The network of factorsfacilitating the use of chemical pesticides
in American agriculture are too numerous and interconnected to
detail here. Broadly, they include: the structure offarm production
and its husbandry by the State; the nature of chemical production,
pesticide usefulness and their biological consequences; the implications offood processing,centralizedmarketing and consumerpreferences; the obstacles to nonchemical pest management alternatives
and to theirpublicly-fundedresearch;the hurdlesto restrictingchemicals already in use; and the lopsided representation of interest
groups and consequent institutionalbias in pesticide policymaking.
While acknowledging the existence of conspiratorialbehaviors, this
analysis of the wider range of contributingcauses suggests that even
if elements of conspiracy had been entirely absent, the outcomes of
pesticide policy making would not have been greatly modified. For
one whose normative sympathies are akin to those espoused by some
conspiracy theorists, the interpretationof history offered here and
prescriptionsfor change are vastly different because they are tempered by a more complex, yet still simplified, synthesis of events and
causation.
*Professor of Resource and Environmental Policy, Centre for Resource Management, Lincoln
College, Canterbury, New Zealand.
**For helpful suggestions with early drafts I wish to thank the Natural Resource Journal editors,
staff and anonymous reviewers, Jim Cramer, Bruce Dixon, Tom Dunlap, Mary Louise Flint, Ted
Foin, Don Hadwiger, Dick Howitt, Fred Li, John Perkins, David Pimentel, Pete Rowland, Bob
Rudd, Si Schwartz, Kevin Shea, Katie Striemer, Phyllis Tichinin and Jim Wilen.
'Inquiring into policy problems can never be free from the influence of values. Hence biases are
best made explicit from the outset: It isthe author's view that pesticide residues infood are ubiquitous,
invisible to the public, and pose uncertain but potentially serious threats to health that are typically
subject neither to 'proof', nor to disproof. Since these risks are imposed involuntarily without
informed consent they violate the widely-held norms of consumer choice and individual liberty.
Having sanctioned the use of chemicals, the federal government has a moral obligation to apply
caution in the assessment of what will always be imperfect information, and imbalanced access to
that information. Often as not the data needed to inform choices were not available to government,
let alone to citizens. Health should not be lightly subverted for reasons that have little to do with
the quality, quantity, and essential variety of food needed by humans.
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INTRODUCTION

This paper explores the question of why chemicals became the most
widely used pest-suppression technique in American agriculture. It analyzes the major factors and historical trends that favored pesticide' use
during the period after their first appearance until 1970, but focuses mainly
on the decades since World War II [WWII]. The complex history of the
American pesticide scene is not easily portrayed, nor is this intended as
a comprehensive account. Indeed much empirical detail remains unpublished. Where detail is available I often summarize, to suggest larger
patterns and implications. But there is certainly information enough to
suggest this synthesis of a political economy in pesticide use.'
The answer to our question of how we came to rely so heavily on
chemical techniques of pest suppression is considerably more complicated
than it appears at first glance. Analysis of this complex situation illuminates the forces that shaped government policy on pesticides for more
1. "Pesticide" is the generic term referring to most of the lethal chemical techniques employed

by humans to limit/prevent pest damage to food products during growth and storage, and to fiber,
health and habitation. By definition, "pests" are organisms that we declare or perceive as detrimental
to our enterprise, or potentially so. Pests include insects, weeds, fungi, nematodes and rodents. The
corresponding categories of pesticides are: insecticides, herbicides, fungicides, nematicides, and
rodenticides. Use trends between these categories of pesticide differ over time and space. The most
extensively applied pesticides in U.S. agriculture are insecticides and herbicides, with the use of
herbicides greater since the 1960s.
This article focuses on agricultural pesticide use in general, even though the examples provided,
and thus the apparent focus, is often on insecticides. In two instances this emphasis is justified by
the facts: first, the first-generation pesticides (1850-1940) were almost exclusively insecticides. It
was not until second-generation pesticides appeared that chemical control of competitive weeds,
fungal disease and root worms became possible. Second, although most pesticides have some adverse
effects on environment and health, technical failures such as pest creation and pest resistance to
chemicals have been most conspicuous with insecticides. See infra notes 77-86. Genetic resistance
in weeds is a comparatively infrequent failure of herbicides. See generally, HERBICIDE RESISTANCE
IN PLANTS (H. LeBaron & J. Gressel eds. 1982). At the very least, insects are more geneticallyadaptable then weeds because plants have both much longer generation times and overlapping
generations due to extended seed dormancy.
Excepting these preceding situations, the emphasis on insecticides is not complete or intentional.
In some instances, it reflects my ignorance of suitable herbicide or fungicide examples. Yet I am
reluctant to confine the scope of this analysis to insecticides alone, because most of the factors
examined apply in varying degrees to pesticides generally, and hopefully any significant over-reaching
on my part will prompt useful rejections, clarifications or extensions of the framework put forward.
2. See, e.g., Blodgett, Pesticides: Regulation ofan Evolving Technology, in 2 CONSUMER HEALTH
AND PRODUCT HAZARDS (S. Epstein & R. Grundy eds. 1974); Conway, Policy Models, in PEST AND
PATHOGEN CONTROL 397 (G. Conway ed. 1984); T. DUNLAP, DDT: SCIENTISTS, CmzENS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1981); J. PERKINS, INSECTS, EXPERTS, AND THE INSECTICIDE CRISIS (1982); A. Whitaker,

A History of Federal Pesticide Regulation in the United States to 1947, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Emory University (1974); J. WHORTON, BEFORE SILENT SPRING (1974). For more sweeping
histories, see, V. DETHIER, MAN'S PLAGUE? INSECTS AND AGRICULTURE (1976); G. ORDISH, THE
CONSTANT PEST (1976). Some aspects of the pesticide equation are difficult to authenticate. E.g.,
the behaviors of individual farmers, chemical corporations and commercial food processors have
not been examined thoroughly. Where sound empirical data are lacking, scholars have often theorized.
This paper identifies such areas of hypothesis, uncertainty and contention.
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than a century. The traditional orientation of the pesticide subgovernment
toward its agricultural clients is revealed, as are the obstacles impeding
those intent upon reducing our reliance on pesticide technology. The early
1970s provides a logical end point for this analysis because important
changes began appearing at that time, and those episodes have been
examined elsewhere. 3
An historical perspective also offers a counterpoint to the tendency
among those personally involved in pesticide affairs to explain their disappointments and vent their anger by seeking scapegoats. In particular,
the critics of pesticide technology often imply or assert that there is a
deliberate conspiracy, that the research scientists have been 'brought off',
or government regulators corrupted, by the chemical industry.' Certainly
pesticide manufacturers, farmers, agricultural scientists, and legislators
tend to be self-interested, and they often find reasons to cooperate when
pursuing their individual goals. However we shall see that they do this
for many reasons other than greed. Rhetoric about subgovernment conspiracy may have been useful for swelling reformer ranks and galvanizing
action but such single-factor explanations are often too simple; they identify only a fraction of the biological, economic, and political forces that
encouraged pesticide uses over time. Cynicism about conspiracy rarely
explains complex situations adequately. More important, by failing to
consider persistent, non-conspiratorial causes, cynicism can promote reforms destined to be disappointing (while ignoring more promising avenues for reform). Still more significant than having reforms miss their
mark, is the possibility that merely tinkering with interactive systems can
produce unanticipated or adverse results the opposite of what was intended. The history of American government is replete with examples of
such counter-intuitive phenomena; efforts at reforming pesticide policy
are no exception.'
THE EXTENT OF PESTICIDE USE
A brief demonstration that we do use pesticides extensively is warranted
before analyzing the reasons for this United States dependency upon
synthetic chemicals to suppress destructive pests. Production and sales
of pesticides grew steadily through the 1970s to a level exceeding half a
3. See infra notes 127, 128.
4. See, e.g., R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING 258-59 (1962); P. BoFFEY, THE BRAIN BANK OFAMERICA,
at chp. 9 (1975); Rodgers, The Persistent Problem of the PersistentPesticides, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
567 (1970); VAN DEN BOSCH, THE PESTICIDE CONSPIRACY (1978); H. WELLFORD, SOWING THE WIND
(1971). Such attitudes have their counterpart among the pesticide manufacturers, see e.g., DUNLAP

supra note 2, at 228-39; also infra note 117.
5. This article highlights a number of examples. See infra note 40; text at note 59; text accompanying note 94; text preceding note 127.
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billion pounds per annum. The economic value of these sales expanded
even more rapidly (due to increased oil prices), with average yearly
increases of twenty percent between 1972 and 1977. Domestic pesticide
sales now exceed one billion dollars annually.6 Further growth is anticipated. The chemical industry foresees annual increments to world-wide
pesticide sales of more than thirteen percent in the next few years. 7
Distribution of pesticides within the domestic market for 1974 was
estimated in the following proportions: fifteen percent was being used for
home and garden purposes; thirty percent was purchased by industrial,
institutional, and government users; and fifty-five percent was put to
agricultural uses.' Pesticide use is unevenly distributed in American farming. For instance, forty-seven percent of all agricultural insecticide use
in the early 1970s occurred on cotton, a predominantly non-food crop
(although chemical residues do appear in the cotton seed oil that is widely
used in prepared foods). Excluding pasture from U.S. cropland, thirtyfour percent of the total acreage in crops was treated with herbicides,
twelve percent with insecticides, and two percent with fungicides. While
grains, vegetables, and fruit accounted for relatively small fractions of
the total volume of agricultural pesticide use, very large proportions of
the area devoted to these high-value food crops did receive chemical
treatments (spraying fifty percent of acreage is typical while seventy-five
percent is not exceptional).'
Although estimates of productivity gains attributable to pesticide use
vary, it is likely that U.S. farmers spend more than $2.2 billion a year
applying chemical pest controls. This investment increases the value of
their crop output by approximately nine percent, for an average return
on their pest control dollar of around four dollars, or 400 percent. ' In
these absolute terms, the financial stakes in pest control are considerable.
6. For all these figures, See PERKINS, supra note 2, at 47-48, (citing U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION,
USITC REP. No. 1099 (1980), SYNTHETIC ORGANIC CHEMICALS: U.S. PRODUCTION AND SALES (1979);
and U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, THE PESTICIDE REVIEW (1966-1978).
7. A Look at a World Pesticide Markets, FARM CHEMICALS, at 61 (Sept. 1979).
8. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, THE PESTICIDE REVIEW (1975).
9. See, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, AGRIC. ECON. REPORT No. 268, FARMERS USE OF

PESTICIDES IN 1971 (1975); Pimentel, Krummel, Gallaham. Hough, Merrill, Schreiner, Vittum,
Koziol, Back, Yen & Fiance. Benefits and Costs of Pesticide Use in U.S. Food Production, 28
BIOSCIENCE 772, 778 (1978) [hereinafter Pimentell.
10. These estimates are developed by Pimentel, supra note 9, at 781. Estimating crop losses from
insect damage and benefits attributable to pesticides is difficult. For a discussion of these questions,
see Pimentel, supra note 9; Conway, Man Versus Pests, in THEORETICAL ECOLOGY, (R. May ed.
1976); J. HEADLEY & A. LEWIS, TiE PESTICIDE PROBLEM: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO PUBLIC POLICY

(1967); Heuth & Regev. Optimal Agricultural Pest Management with Increasing Pest Resistance,
56 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 543 (1974); Norgaard, The Economics of Improving Pesticide Use, 21 ANN.
REV. ENTOMOL. 45 (1976); Davidson & Norgaard, Economic Aspects of Pest Control, paper delivered
at the Annual Meetings of the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization, Brussels,
(May 15, 1973); Hall & Norgaard, On the Timing and Application of Pesticides, 55 AM. . AGRIC.
ECON. 198 (1973); PERKINS, supra note 2, at 196-99, 266-67; Talpaz & Borosch, Strategy for
Pesticide Use, 56 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 769 (1974).
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However, our commitment to chemical techniques is not so compelling
when examined in aggregate terms. If all pesticide use in American
agriculture were to cease, the evidence suggests that the additional nine
percent in crop losses would bring only temporary price increases but no
food shortages." Furthermore, adjustments in the market could quickly
normalize food prices as increased plantings, dietary shifts and other
factors offset the initial twelve percent rise in retail prices estimated to
accompany such an unlikely cessation of use. 2 Pesticide use appears even
less justified when these equivocal benefits are compared with the hidden
costs and the available alternatives. Where the risks inherent to chemical
contamination are palpable, and safer alternatives are economically viable, dependence-on pesticides seems excessive and irrational in the minds
of critics. While determinations of safety and economic viability are
matters of judgment over which reasonable people routinely disagree, it
is clear that by 1970 the combined influence of several factors had contributed to the extensive and rapidly expanding use of pesticides in food
production.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO PESTICIDE USE
Six aspects of the pest management situation that facilitate the use of
pesticides can be identified. These include: the structure of agricultural
production and the role of the state; the nature of pesticide production;
use and biological consequences; the implications of food processing,
marketing and consumption; the obstacles to nonchemical alternatives
and to public research; the hurdles to restricting chemicals already in use;
and the lopsided politics and institutional bias associated with pesticide
policymaking. These six aspects are further disentangled in twelve factors,
see Table 1. Some of the factors in Table I illustrates the strength of
forces that encourage pesticide use and prevent their discontinuation,
while others demonstrate the weakness of otherwise restraining influences.
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE
The Economic Structure of Agriculture
Farm production in America has long been a keenly competitive cashcropping enterprise in which individuals take large financial risks and
sometimes fail to make adequate returns on their investment. This single
II. Pimentel, supra note 9, at 779-80. Historically it is clear pesticides were not introduced to
boost aggregate food production and therefore alleviate human hunger. Second-generation insecticides
were adopted at a time when American farmers were threatened with yet another ruinous series of
crop surpluses as WWII ended. Perkins, Insects, Food, and Hunger: The Paradox of Plent for U.S.
Entomology, 1920-1970, 7 ENVTL. REv. 71-96 (Spring 1983).
12. Pimental, supra note 9, at 780-81.
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TABLE I
WHY PESTICIDES RECEIVED EXTENSIVE USE IN
AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO
PESTICIDE USE
i. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND
THE ROLE OF THE STATE
a. Competitive commercial agriculture:
many smaller risk-averse, profit-seeking
firms producing for export to urban markets.
b. Government services for agriculture: research and active diffusion of improved
techniques as well as marketing orders,
price supports, favorable credit, tax and
labor laws.

II. PESTICIDE PRODUCTION. USE AND
CONSEQUENCES
a. A dynamic pesticide industry: emphasis
on continual research to discover new
broad-spectrum pesticides.
b. The nature of pesticide technology: immediate utility with hidden costs.

c. The biological treadmill: increasing dependence on pesticides and eventual failures.

Ill. FOOD PROCESSING, MARKETING AND
CONSUMPTION
a. Consumer "preferences" for cosmetic
perfection in food.

IV. OBSTACLES TO THE ALTERNATIVES
AND TO PUBLIC RESEARCH
a. Barriers to the discovery and adoption
of the alternatives to chemical pesticides.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND CONTINUING
CAUSES

Urbanization, private ownership, mechanization, farm-to-city transportation, cheap fossil-fuel
energy, inelastic demand for food, and the technological treadmill.
Production problems, climatic variation, insect
pests, wartime demands, competition between
both individual farmers and rural jurisdictions,
overproduction and instability of farm incomes.

War-time insect control needs, patent law,
emergence of a petroleum-based chemicals industry, genetic resistance, high research and development costs including government regulations.
Broad-spectrum activity, inexpensive, competitive marketing, susceptible regional monocultures; novel chemical/biological behavior, oilsoluble residues, externality of costs.
Abandonment of cultural practices, broad-spectrum activity, greater adaptability (migratory, reproductive and genetic) of pest species, and overexploitation of pest susceptibility (a common pool
resource).

Overproduction, inelastic demand for food, fixed
costs of transportiprocessing, competitive food
marketing, commercial advertising, fastidious
urban consumers, invisibility of pesticide residues, and government limits on insect-debris and
defects.

WWII disrupted government research, chemicals
preempted interest, patent law, research costs,
narrow markets; cosmetic standards, contingent
financing, risk-averse farmers, complexity.
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FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO
PESTICIDE USE
V. HURDLES TO RESTRICTING CHEMICALS ALREADY IN USE
a. Irresolvable technical uncertainty: many
costs, such as the cancer risk for humans, cannot be unequivocally proven
by science.
b. The law of nuisance: party challenging
an economic activity must bear the burden of proof and sustain a balancing of
inconveniences.
c. Obstacles to gathering environmental intelligence on the risks of pesticide use.

VI. LOPSIDED POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONAL BIAS
a. Closed pesticide subgovernment: making favorable policy and blocking inimical reforms.

b. Poorly mobilized citizen concerns about
pesticide use and residues.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND CONTINUING
CAUSES

Limitations of scientific method, inadequate control groups, long latency periods, moral aversion
to human experiments, cost of laboratory tests,
and imperfection of the animal-to-man analogy.
Traditional legal policies for encouraging economic development and employment, judicial
conservatism and restraint.
Detection problems, irresolvable technical uncertainty, insufficient research support, costs slow
to materialize, war research priority, academic
career patterns and peer pressure, industry funding, and subgovemment hostility.

Constitutional structure, fragmentation of legislative power, veto advantages in Congress, disproportionate rural representation, broad delegations and administrative secrecy, irresolvable
technical doubt, judicial and presidential reluctance to intrude (poorly mobilized citizen concerns).
Competing concerns, invisibility of residues,
technical uncertainty over risks, little media coverage, the free-rider problem and the costs of
organizing for sustained political/legal activity.

feature, more than any other, has predisposed farmers to adopt technological innovations that reduce production costs and insure their investments against the vicissitudes of nature. While the precise details vary
across time periods, regions, crops, and even particular pesticides, it is
useful to construct a broad scenario of U.S. agricultural development for
the first half of the twentieth century. 3 Historically, land ownership patterns with many small tenant farmers facilitated competition among growers. With increasing urbanization, economic prosperity, population growth
and the development of farm-to-city transportation, American farmers
experienced a rising demand for their produce. But that transformation
from small local, to distant urban markets also undermined farmers'
13. See generally, Hadwiger, AgriculturalPolicy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICY STUDIES (S. Nagel

ed. 1983), W.
(1979);

COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

WHORTON,

supra note 2, at 3-35. For a brief case study of the U.S. Apple Industry see

PERKINS, supra note

2, at 15-22.
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economic bargaining power. 4 As commercial markets emerged and as
mechanization and plant breeding revolutionized agriculture, growers tended
to specialize in one main crop. Others emulated these early financial
successes. The results were a regional shift toward monocultures which
had the unintended consequences of making individual farms more vulnerable to pest outbreaks. "

While pests existed throughout history and periodically caused localized famines, 6 their economic significance grew by the turn of the century.
This was due to the widespread adoption of monoculture, the associated

decline in crop rotation practices, and the development of higher-yielding

but more pest-susceptible crop varieties. 7 Also, several particularly destructive foreign pests were introduced accidentally as world commerce
spread.' Not only did farm crops become more prone to pest outbreaks,
markets became less tolerant of damaged produce. The expansion into
14. The magnitude of United States' over-investment in agriculture, resulting from massive govemiment land give-aways between 1868 and 1920, became apparent only after farmers shifted from
economic self-sufficiency to cash crop production. As the number of American farms doubled, then
trebled, and as productivity soared, declining prices undermined farm incomes. Cheap credit exacerbated this over-investment in farming. See K. MEIER, REGULATION 128 (1985). Farm-to-city
freight rates also declined during this period, but did not fall as rapidly as farm prices. Farmers'
resultant economic insecurity and their liberal democratic traditions led to the widespread emergence
of rural populism. On rural populism see, L. GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1976); Hadwiger, supra note 13, at 504-505; S. LIPsET, AGRARIAN SOCIALISM
(1950); G. MCCONNELL, THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY 9 (1953); Brym, Regional Social
Structure andAgrarian Radicalism in Canada, 15 CAN. REV. SOc. & ANTHRO. 339 (1978), Conway,
Populism in the United States, Russia, and Canada, II CAN. J. POL. SCI. 99 (1978); Richards,
Populism: A Qualified Defense, 5 STUD. IN POL. ECON. 5 (1981); Sinclair, Class Structure and
Populist Protest, I CAN. J. SOC. I (1975). In placing blame for their plight, small farmers and
merchants made scapegoats of the railroads. Eventually the populist sentiment succeeded in imposing
regulation on those natural monopolies, the railroads. Kemp, Political Parties, Industrial Structures
and Political Support for Regulation in PUB. POL'Y FORMATION 164 (R. Eyestone ed. 1984).
15. Pimentel, The Ecological Basis of Insect Pest, Pathogen and Weed Problems, in ORIGINS OF
PEST, PARASITE, DISEASE AND WEED PROBLEMS 3 (J. Cherrett & G. Sagar eds. 1977); [hereinafter
ORIGINS]; Way, Pest and Disease Status in Mixed Stands vs. Monocultures; The Relevance of Ecosystem Stability, in ORIGINS id. at 127; Norton & Conway, The Economic and Social Context of
Pest, Disease and Weed Problems, in ORIGINS at 205; DETHIER, supra note 2, at 28-37; PERKINS,
supra note 2, at 15, 249, 268; WHORTON, supra note 2, at 5. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, PRINCIPLES OF PLANT AND ANIMAL PEST CONTROL, Vol.

3,

INSECr-PEST MANAGEMENT AND

CONTROL (1969); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PEST CONTROL: AN ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT AND
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES,

Vol. I,

CONTEMPORARY PEST CONTROL PRACTICES AND PROSPECTS

(1975).
16. On the significance of grasshoppers in early U.S. agriculture, see Schlebecker, Grasshoppers
in American Agricultural Hist., 27 AGRIC. HIST. 85 (1953).
17. The decline in crop rotation and other traditional practices exacerbated insect pest, crop
disease, and weed problems. See infra, note 80. The introduction of high-yielding crops compounded
these problems because the new varieties were usually more susceptible to disease and insect pests.
See lhde. Pest and Disease Controls, in 2 TECHNOLOGY INWESTERN CIvIuZATION 85 (M. Kranzbergh,
C. Pursell eds. 1967).
18. See Howard, Danger of Importing Insect Pests, in 1897 YEARBOOK OF TilE UNrrED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (1898); C. ELTON, THE ECOLOGY OF INVASIONS BY PLANTS AND ANIMALS
(1958); DUNLAP, supra note 2, at 18-19; WHORTON, supra note 2. at ch. 1.
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distant markets necessitated shipment only of premium quality fruit and
vegetables of maximum durability. This was due to fixed transportation
costs, and increasing selectivity among competitively supplied urban buyers and consumers. Under these biological and market circumstances,
continuing farm prosperity depended upon the ability to control pests.
Once cost-effective crop protection and weed control technologies existed, individual farmers could hardly afford to go without them. With
the exception of minor markets for organically-grown food, those farmers
who did not adopt chemical innovations risked being forced out of busi-

ness by their more progressive neighbors. As with advances in farm
technology generally, the early adopters of pesticides temporarily reaped
significant income benefits by lowering their own unit costs of production;
when the laggards attempted to emulate these successes, aggregate production increased sufficiently to drive prices down and thus eliminate the

short-run income gains. Farmers who for one reason or other did not
adopt an improved technology were left with shrunken incomes since
their unit costs of production remained high while prices received were

falling. Cochrane 9 has fittingly termed this inexorable process "the agricultural treadmill."
Also, with the rising capital intensity and credit financing of agriculture,
farmers may have become increasingly risk averse. Typically they are
seen as adopting strategies to minimize chances of catastrophic crop
failure (minimax).2 ° In addition to increasing farm productivity, pesticides
provide a measure of protection against uncertainty. Indeed many of the
lending institutions offered farm credit contingent upon the use of pesticides-a form of crop and loan insurance.2t
19. W. COCHRANE, FARM PRICES: MYTH AND REALITY 85 (1958); COCHRANE, supra note 13, at

378-409. See also PERKINS, supra note 2, at 13, 143,268. Cochrane's theory is robust and particularly
applicable to the post-wWll era, but detailed empirical assessments applying his theory to the
adoption of pesticide technology are unknown.
20. The conventional view of agricultural economics views farmers as risk averse entrepreneurs
who attempt to reduce year-to-year variability in net income, rather than maximizing gains in a
given year. Regev, An Economic Analysis of Man's Addiction to Pesticides, in PEST AND PATHOGEN

supra note 2, at 441. Other evidence suggests the theory may not be accurate. The advent
of non-recourse loans using crops as collateral, under the Agricultural Adjustments Act of 1938,
Feb. 16, 1938, ch. 30; 52 Stat. 31; 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407 (1982), certainly reduced risks to recipient
farmers. Moreover, in the current credit crisis of U.S. agriculture, and given existing bankruptcy
laws, farmers face enormous incentives to take risk-loving strategies such as planting crops without
pesticides. Rather than enrolling in crop insurance programs, it appears that many farmers rely upon
governmental deficiency payments. Farmers may have been more risk averse in earlier times, before
public institutions such as deficiency payments and limited bankruptcy provided a safety net. Even
if risk aversion contributed little to their pesticide calculus, the economic treadmill (supra note 19),
credit contingency (infra note 21), and the biological treadmill (infra notes 77-86) would have been
compelling enough reasons for using chemicals, while desires for feeding the American people had
no impact whatsoever (supra note 11).
21. See MCCONNELL, supra note 14; A. NELSON & W. MURRAY, AGRICULTURAL FINANCE 2, 188
(1967); PERKINS, supra note 2, at 219, 232, 268-69; Doutt & Smith, infra, note 62.
CONTROL,
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Because of technology-based productivity gains, United States agriculture became chronically prone to the economic trap in which the uncoordinated actions of many individuals leads to collective overproduction, market saturation, and plummeting prices. This happens because
consumer demand for farm products has a low level of elasticity with
respect to the quantity supplied.22 Climatic variation and new technology
tended to compound these uncertainties, as did the major wars. While
wars increased the demand for agricultural goods, they also created labor
shortages and sudden declines in demand with the cessation of hostilities.23
Generally, it was the larger, more heavily-capitalized farmers who survived these disruptive forces24 by staying at the leading edge of technical
developments and thus perpetually reaping the short-run income gains.
Indeed, the relative cost of farm inputs in the United States has encouraged

the substitution of technology, energy and land for human labor through-

out this century.25 Government farm policies compounded the trend.
The extended agricultural depression, between the World Wars, saw
the preceding factors and others operate in combination to drive thousands
of small farmers from the land. When government intervened with price
supports and acreage limitations in an effort to eliminate these destructive
fluctuations, the result, once again, was to further encourage the use of
technical innovations such as tractors, new plant varieties and fertilizer.
By stabilizing farm incomes, price supports enabled larger farms to finance capital-intensive improvements that gave them an advantage over
their labor-intensive neighbors.26 Moreover, with restrictions only on the
22. See Brandow, Interrelations among Demands for Farm Products and Implications for Control
of Market Supply, PENN. STATE UNIv. BULL. No. 680 (1961); COCHRANE, supra note 19, at 86-89;
THE OVERPRODucTIoN TRAP INU.S. AGRICULTURE (G. Johnson & C. Quance eds. 1972). Per capita
consumption of food (caloric intake) in America has changed little over this century. However,
consumer demands changed as disposable income grew, as processed food became available, as
storage and transport of fresh produce became more efficient, and as dietary preferences altered.
For brief reviews of political responses to agricultural overproduction, see T. Lowi, TiE END OF
LIBERALISM 68-77 (1979); Hadwiger, supra note 13.
23. Under the Marshall Plan following WWII, prices were maintained through accelerated foreignaid shipments of U.S. produce. See PERKINS, supra note 2, at 228.
24. For brief reviews of the socioeconomic dislocations caused by the U.S. agricultural revolution,
see PERKINS, id. at 210; Shea, American Agriculture: Who Stole the Revolution?, 18 ENv'T 28 (1976);
J. HIGHTOWER, HARD TOMATOES HARD TIMES (1972); Haynes, Agriculture in the U.S.: Its Impact
on Ethic and Other Minority Groups, 2 AGRIC. & HUMAN VALUES I (Symposium issue, Summer
1985).
25. See, e.g., Johnson, The Impact of Farm Machinery on the Farm Economy, 24 AGRIC. HIST.
58 (1950); Calvert, The Technological Revolution in Agriculture, 1910-1955, 30 AGRIC. HIST. 18
(1956); Rasmussen, The Impact of Technological Change on American Agriculture, 22 J. ECON.
HIST. 578 (1962); MEIER, supra note 14, at 127; Ellickson & Brewster, Technological Advances and
the Structure of American Agriculture, 29 J. FARM EcON. 827 (1947). Compare the situation in
Japan, where land (not labor) has been in short supply. See, Y. HAYAMI & V. RUTTAN, AGRICULTURAL
DEvELOPMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEcTiVE 133 (1971).
26. E.g., PERKINS, supra note 2, at 227, 228. Several New Deal programs were intended to assist
poor and often illiterate small-scale farmers. These programs were initially administered from Washington, D.C. During the war years, the Farm Bureau (a private organization representing the larger,
more successful farmers) managed to have the New Deal programs decentralized and transferred to
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number of acres planted, prosperous farmers shifted to a more intensive
use of land, by substituting technologies such as hybrid seed, fertilizer,
irrigation, and pesticides. Thus, while price supports may have enabled
marginal farms to persist for some years, governmental intercession ultimately contributed to continuing overproduction, economic dislocations
and further concentration within the industry. This result occurred because
larger farms with stabilized incomes could finance the purchase of their
small, less-competitive neighbors.27
Finally, few political jurisdictions were tempted to restrain the use of
pesticides within their borders. Just as individual farmers had little choice
in this matter, counties, states, and even nations relying heavily upon
agriculture could not realistically restrict pesticide use. To have done so
would have put their farmers at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis those
in neighboring jurisdictions.28 Beside sparking protest, such moves would
selectively depress their own economy and tax revenues. Only when
threatened with a loss of exports due to excessive arsenic residues, for
example, was there some countervailing incentive to regulate locally.29
Even when an agricultural jurisdiction did adopt restrictions, enforcement
was often lax, so individual farmers were encouraged to violate those
regulations. Farmers did not violate regulations because they are particularly greedy. Rather, competition has routinely selected against those
who failed to insure their investments against the potential ravages of
pests and other threats to viability.
Government Services for Agriculture
Historically, farm-based governments have devised many ways to nurture their unstable, export-oriented rural economies. As discussed above,
state extension services of land grant colleges. Thereafter, larger farmers controlled access to credit
through the U.S. Farm Credit Administration and reinforced the trend toward economic concentration.
See, Lowi, supra note 22, at 73.
27. See COCHRANE, supra note 13, at 378-95; MEIER, supra note 14, at 135; PERKINS, supra note
2, at 226.
28. For a review of this literature and some recent data, see Rowland & Matz, Gresham's Law:
The Regulatory Analogy, I POL'Y STUD. REV. 572 (1982). Moreover, the politicans were often
farmers themselves, so the effective unity of goals among farmers and their elected representatives
meant the prevailing ethos was one of "promoting pesticide use." Dubnick, From Facilitation to
Control: Changes in the Regulatory Relationship between Government and Agriculture, paper presented at the Fourth Annual Hendricks Symposium, Univ. of Nebraska, Lincoln (Apr. 5, 1979).
Restrictions on pesticide use were rarely contemplated. Indeed, some jurisdictions even mandated
pesticide use (including compensation to the government for spray costs if a farmer refused to treat
his crop himself) in an effort to control and quarantine economically important pests within their

borders.
29. There is some evidence that agricultural jurisdictions do not voluntarily impose controls.
E.g., early in this century, Western United States apples were first seized for containing excessive
residues of arsenic, not by local authorities, but by England and eastern North American's large
cities. See WHORTON, supra note 2, at 95-175; see also Whitaker, supra note 2. For an analogous
case involving import restrictions against diseased U.S. meat and animals, see A. DUPREE, SCIENCE
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 163-65 (1957).
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public sponsorship has recently included price supports, acreage limitations, and reluctance to restrict pesticides (as well as favorable labor laws,

tax treatment, marketing orders, import restrictions, transport infrastruc-

ture, and farm credit).3" Government recognition of the economic significance and frailty of agriculture preceded the discovery of commercial
pesticides." For instance, the Constitution granted patent rights which
still encourage the private invention of farm machifiery. Then the United
States Department of Agriculture [USDA], our first clientele-oriented
administrative agency, was established in 1862 explicitly to serve agriculture by sponsoring research and collecting useful data.3 2 At the time,
the acceptable role of federal government was relatively limited, so a
decentralized system emerged in which the U.S. government provided
non-intrusive incentives for state action. The resulting land grant colleges
(1862), agricultural experiment stations (1887), and the cooperative extension service (1914) were created to provide agricultural education, to
perform research on new techniques, and to help transfer new knowledge
into farm improvements in every rural county. Within this elaborate institutional setting, all studies, including those on pest control, were directed toward solving farm problems. Not surprisingly, research scientists
dedicated themselves to devising techniques for increasing farm productivity and lowering unit production costs.33 This utilitarian focus was
eventually reinforced by clientele support for research funding.34
Historically, farmers had difficulty establishing effective political or-

ganizations.35 Such a group finally emerged following the Smith-Lever
Act of 1914,36 which provided federal matching funds for the employment
of county-level extension agents. The extension task, to transfer new

30. See COCHRANE, supra note 13; J. Wason, Legislative History of the Exclusion ofAgricultural
Employees from the National Labor Relations Act 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1939,
Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service (May 19, 1966).
31. See generally M. BENEDICT, FARM POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1950 (1966); H.
BREIMEYER, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE (1965); D.
HADWIGER, THE POLITICS OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, at ch. 2 (1982); WHORTON, supra note 2,
at 3-35; E. WIEST, AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1923).
32. E.g.,, Nelson, A Short, Ironic History of American National Bureaucracy, 44 J. POL. 747
(1982). As an intentionally clientele-oriented agency, the USDA was not entirely unprecedented.
See Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 77 (1975). On the history
of the USDA see W. RASMUSSEN & G. BAKER, THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (1972);
DUPREE, supra note 29, at 157-61.
33. DUPREE, supra note 29, at 172-73; PERKINS, supra note 2, at 250-53. See generally, A.
MARCUS, AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE AND THE QUEST FOR LEGmMACY (1985). The early clienteleorientation of economic entomology was reinforced by the unscrupulous people who defrauded
farmers with useless pesticide products, and by association, gave the professionals who recommended
chemicals a bad name. PERKINS, supra note 2, at chs. 3, 5.
34. See, e.g., HADWIGER, supra note 31, at ch. 2; PERKINS, supra note 2, at 242, 255-57; Buttel,
The Land-Grant System: A Sociological Perspective on Value Conflicts and Ethical Issues, 2 AGRIC.
& HUMAN VALUES 88, 92 (Spring 1985); Marcus, The History of Agricultural Research, in PUBLIC
POLICY AND AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY (D. Hadwiger & W. Browne eds. 1986).
35. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTtON; PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
148-59 (1971).
36. May 8, 1914, ch. 79; 38 Stat. 372; 7 U.S.C. §§341-49 (1982).
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research and technologies onto the farm, necessitated that the county
agents develop and maintain a receptive audience. That audience turned
out to be the technically progressive elements, which usually consisted
of the larger and more prosperous farmers. 7 Perceiving the benefits of
government-sponsored research, those locally organized groups amalgamated statewide and then nationally in 1919 to form the American Farm
Bureau Federation.3" Following this innocent beginning, a comfortable
mutual relationship evolved as the Farm Bureau and various commodity
groups lobbied for government subsidies to solve farm production prob-

lems.39 Meanwhile, the availability of government and industry funding

created professional opportunities for research scientists, many of whom
came both from farm backgrounds and service-oriented universities. It

was a subtle process.
As others have pointed out, this research network soon aimed almost
exclusively at surmounting the problems of commercialagriculture, where
progressive farmers had access to the capital needed for adopting new
technologies. 4' Pest suppression was high on the list of research priorities,
particularly following WWII. Research on chemical methods thrived in
this atmosphere of meeting the needs of a growing nation through service
to commercial agriculture while other factors inhibited the development
of nonchemical alternatives in pest management.
PESTICIDE PRODUCTION, USE AND CONSEQUENCES
A Dynamic Pesticide Industry
The chemical industry underwent a fundamental transition around WWII,
as the production and use of pesticides increased dramatically. 4 Insec37. See BAKER, THE COUNTY AGENT (1939); MCCONNELL, supra note 14, at chs. 3, 5.
38. OLSON, supra note 35; J. SHIDLER, FARM CRISIS 1919-1923 (1957); S. BERGER, DOLLAR
HARVEST: AN EXPOSE OF THE FARM BUREAU (1971).
39. See, e.g., C. CAMPBELL, THE FARM BUREAU AND THE NEW DEAL (1962); BERGER, supra note
38; HADWIGER, supra note 31; Lowi, supra note 22.
40. Capital investment has been heavily subsidized by the tax system and further encouraged by
easy access to farm credit.The great paradox of American agriculture is that while development was
intended to benefit farmers, many thousands of farmers were ruined by the technological treadmill
which created crop surpluses and therefore depressed prices, except during the war years. Almost
all farmers purchased technological advances on credit. Those who adopted technology early were
able to pay off their purchases, late adopters often experienced shrinking incomes and difficulty
making loan repayments. This social effect and other implications of agricultural research and
technology were disregarded by the government. The scientists were aligned with commercial agriculture and tended to ignore research or de-emphasize results that would embarrass their clients.
PERKINS, SHEA & HIGHTOWER, supra note 24.

Government programs frequently help those least in need. P. Sa.zNICK, TVA, AND THE GRASS
RooTs (1949). Recent experiences suggest that inegalitarian outcomes are not always unanticipated
in federal programs. See, Robertson, Program Implementation Versus Program Design: Which
Accounts for Policy "Failure"? 3 POL'Y STUD. REV. 391 (1984); Gibson, Goodin & LeGrand,
Distributional Biases in Social Service Delivery Systems, 13 POL'Y & POLITICs 109 (1983).
41. See, PERKINS, supra note 2, at 4748; and Perkins, Reshaping Technology in Wartime: The
Effect of Military Goals on Entomological Research and Insect Control Practices, 19 TECHNOLOGY
& CULTURE 169 (1978). For a graph that dramatically represents growth at the aggregate level, see
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ticides first received intensive use at the end of the nineteenth century,
but only on the most valuable crops. That first era in pesticide technology
employed inorganic materials (predominantly copper sulfate and salts of
arsenic) and plant extracts (such as pyrethrum and nicotine).42 Chemically
simple or naturally occurring, these compounds were easily produced,
so a fragmented market emerged with many small, sometimes itinerant
dealers, and farmers often mail ordered and mixed the materials themselves. Such conditions made it easy to bilk farmers with adulterated or
useless chemicals.43 Fraud discouraged farmers from using pesticides,
and this upset the large, more reputable manufacturers. Following initiatives by several states,' Congress responded with the Insecticide Act of
1910.' It was a simple statute designed to protect farmers (and thus the
manufacturers) by requiring accurate labels that specified the minimum
percentage of active ingredients in the arsenical pesticides. The statute
also created a government bureau to enforce new standards.' By that
time total annual sales were estimated at $20 million, with a dozen or so
companies sharing most of that market.47 The pesticidal properties of a
few artificially-synthesized organic chemicals were discovered during and
after WWI, but it was not until WWII that the second era in pesticide
technologies took hold. The war precipitated an intense USDA search for
useful pesticides. When a Swiss chemical company unveiled DDT to
U.S. officials, the new material was rapidly evaluated and recommended
for disease-control uses by the military.48 DDT was a dramatic technological success that was turned to public health and domestic agricultural
uses soon after the war. It was cheaper and more effective than all existing
methods. Thus, DDT and a few other synthetic organic pesticides quickly
displaced earlier pest control practices, including the use of arsenical
sprays.4 9
The new products were sufficiently cheap and so effective as to stimulate their use against a wide variety of insects previously beyond the
economic reach of chemical pest suppression.5' The corporate response
to this lucrative market was rapid. Total production of DDT by U.S.
Davis & Magee, Cancer and Industrial Chemical Production, 206 Sci. 1356 (1979). We can only

theorize about individual pesticide enterprises, which are especially diverse, necessarily secretive,
and difficult for scholars to probe.
42. E.g., Blodgett, supra note 2, at 200-203; Dunlap, The Triumph of Chemical Pesticides in
Insect Control, 1880-1929, I ENvTv. REv. 38 (Nov. 5, 1978).
43. See, Hadwiger & Miller, Regulation of Pesticides by the State of Iowa, 54 IOWA ST. J. ReS.

65, 68 (1979). See also Whitaker, supra note 2; WnowrON, supra note 2.
44. E.g., Hadwiger & Miller, supra note 43.
45. Apr. 26, 1910; ch. 191; 36 Stat. 335, repealed by Act of June 25, 1947, ch. 125, § 16; 61

Stat. 172; current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y)(1982).
46. Cf. Whitaker, supra note 2.
47. Id. at 101, 216.
48. See PERKINS, supra note 2, at 6-10.
49. E.g., DuNLAP, supra note 2, at 253-54; PERKINS, supra note 2, at 11-12; Blodgett, supra

note 2, at 202.
50. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 11.
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firms increased from 10 million pounds in 1944 to more than 100 million
pounds in 1951.51 Over a similar period, between 1945 and 1953, manufacturers introduced some twenty-five new synthetic organic pesticides
into commerce, among them some very effective herbicides.52 In the span
of a decade or so, profitable growth had transformed the production of
pesticides from a relatively small, decentralized, and chemically-simple
affair into a large scale industrial process for synthesizing pesticides, and
other complex chemicals from fossil-fuel distillates. Reflecting that technological transition, by 1950 the chemical industry had become large,
product-diverse, and politically well organized."
This shift to second generation technologies and the industrial structure
needed for pesticide discovery and production had several implications
which appear to have promoted the farmer's reliance upon chemical
methods of pest suppression, which worked and at affordable prices.
There were more subtle influences as well. The synthetic organic pesticides are both considerably more research intensive to develop and more
capital intensive to produce than their first generation counterpartssimple salts and plant poisons. High costs constrained the types of products that were developed and marketed in a manner that facilitated the
widespread adoption of chemicals.
While estimates of research and development costs vary, they are high,
and they are rising.54 Because of these costs, companies must capture
large markets if product-lines are to remain profitable. Hence corporate
research seeks chemicals with a broad spectrum of effectiveness. Narrowly-selective products do not usually recoup development costs because
their sales are restricted to a few'susceptible pests.55 Moreover, the cost
of financing synthetic pesticide production may have reinforced the cor51. Id. at 13.

52. USDA

PRODUCTION AND MARKEING ADMINISTRATION, THE PESTICIDE SITUATION FOR

1952-

1953 (1953); see also Whitaker, supra note 2, at 407, 428-39.
53. The National Agricultural Chemicals Association [NACA] was established in 1933 and it
began publication of apesticide trade journal in 1946. Agricultural Chemicals. DUNLAP, supra note

2, at 73; Whitaker, supra note 2, at 424.
54. See generally, R. BROADMAN, PESTICIDES IN WORLD AGRICULTURE: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 35 (1986); L. Hatch, The Effect of Environmental Protection Agency Regulation
on Research and Development in the Pesticide Industry, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univ. of
Minn. (1982); W. Lazarus, Optimal Management of a Common Property Pest under Risk: An
Application to the Corn Rootworm, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Ill., Urbana (1981)
Von Rumker, Guest & Upholt, The Search for Safer, More Selective, and Less Persistent Pesticides,
20 BIOSCIENCE 1004 (1970); COUNCIL ON AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, IMPACT OF
GOVERNMENT REGULATION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL PESTICIDES FOR AGRICULTURE AND

FORESTRY (1980) (development costs are presently estimated at around $15 million for each new
pesticide registered for use).
55. The obvious exception occurs when a particular pest or weed causes widespread damage in
an economically important crop. While there are few incentives for the discovery of narrow-spectrum
products, the development of less-persistent chemicals (fewer residues) is encouraged since they
require more frequent use. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (1975), supra note 15, at 139 (with
Professor John H. Perkins as consultant). Narrow-spectrum are more desirable because they cause
less disruption of non-target species and generate fewer secondary pests. The biological treadmill
phenomenon is discussed, infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
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porate predisposition for products likely to attract large markets through
broad-spectrum activity. 6 Two additional factors tended to exacerbate
manufacturer preference for widely-active pesticides. Soon after the new
chemicals were introduced, it became apparent that pests could develop
genetic resistance to them. The threat of resistance implied that the useful
life of any particular pesticide would be limited.57 This encouraged a
strategy of competition by successive introduction of new chemicalswhich, in turn, necessitated constant innovation and research." Again,
research facilities could only be paid for through larger sales. And more
recently, the growing stringency of required safety tests contributed further to the corporate emphasis on broad-spectrum pesticides by increasing
the cost of licensing new products for the market. 59
While the search for broad-spectrum pesticides was certainly successful, their adverse social ramifications quietly mounted. Individual farmers
were often confronted with competing products which, from their standpoint, were essentially indistinguishable. This feature, together with the
need to educate users to the steady flow of new products, led manufacturers into extensive advertising campaigns and aggressive sales tactics.'
Most farmers received their information exclusively from the trade tabloids and directly from company representatives. All this competition in
sales may have kept pesticide prices down, but low prices also encourage
excessive use by the risk averse." Once the highly decentralized system
of on-farm marketing was established it became possible (even necessary)
for company salesmen to slip into promoting unnecessary and unsuitable
uses. Given their personal experiences with crop failure, the fickle nature
of their market, and their dependence upon credit financing, it was economically rational for individual farmers to resolve their doubts in favor
of taking out insurance, in effect by applying pesticides more often than
might be "strictly necessary." 6"
56. E.g., The Chemical Surge, Bus. WK., Mar. 18, 1950, at 117.
57. See, e.g., Smith, Racial segregation in Insect Populations and its Significance in Applied
Entomology, 34 J. ECON. ENTOMOLOGY I (1941); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REGULATING
PESTICIDES 74-75 (1980). See also infra note 78 and accompanying text.
58. Early in this century chemical manufacturers adopted the strategy of constant research and
development. E.g., A. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 374-75, 473-76 (1977).
59. For a general introduction, see supra note 54; Tucker, Of Mites and Men, 257 HARPER'S 43
(1978); TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY (C. Hill & J. Utterback eds. 1979);
Ashford & Heaton, Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS.109 (Summer 1983); Davies, The Effects of Federal Regulation on Chemical
Industry Innovation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Id. at 41 (Summer 1983).
60. See, e.g., DETHIER, supra note 2, at 124-25; PERKINS, supra note 2, at 14; VAN DEN BOSCH,
supra note 4, at 238-63; WEiLLFORD, supra note 4, at 280.
61. The price of DDT fell from over $1 per pound in 1945 to about 25 cents per pound by the
mid-1950s. DUNLAP, supra note 2, at 254.
62. On the insurance quality of pesticide use see, e.g., supra, notes 20, 21 and accompanying
text; Doutt & Smith; The Pesticide Syndrome-Diagnosis and Suggested Prophylaxis, in BIOLOGICAL
CONTROL (C. Huffaker ed. 1971); PERKINS, supra note 2, at 232, 268-69; WELLFORD, supra note 4,
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Immediate Utility with Hidden Costs
New pesticides, more than many technical innovations, have benefits
that are immediate and readily apparent while their costs are far less
obvious and occur in the distant future.63 Their benefits are virtually known
in advance since it is the prospect of profitable breakthroughs that motivates the haphazard search for effective new chemicals. On the other
hand, the potential costs associated with adopting a technical innovation
are often obscure during the initial stages of discovery, and may remain
uncertain even after the technology had been in use for several years. 6'
Such temporal disparities in our accumulation of knowledge favor a presumption of using new technologies, especially in the case of pesticides
where their costs are borne elsewhere (in time and space) by people other
than the manufacturer/farmer beneficiaries.
This general bias in the appearance of information was compounded
by historical circumstances at the time second-generation pesticides were
being developed. While evaluating DDT for military uses, the federal
government was careful to assess the new chemical's safety. However,
under the pressures of war including limited time, dwindling supplies of
imported botanical pesticides, and the certainty of disease epidemics,
those tests emphasized the acute, short-term toxicity to persons directly
exposed.65 That truncated evaluation confirmed that the acute mammalian
toxicity of DDT was indeed low, so the chemical was released for immediate military use. It was safe to apply, effective against a wide variety
of pests, cheap, readily sprayable, and persistent. All of these qualities
contributed to its substantial war-time successes against insect-borne disease. Extensive publicity portrayed DDT as one of the technologies that
helped to win the war and this encouraged its rapid release to civilian
uses. Although there were scientists who correctly viewed these gross
manipulations of biological systems with skepticism, their protest was
futile amid such popular acclaim and unprecedented technological optimism. DDT's early record was so impressive that many entomologists
talked for the first time of eradicating the insect vectors of several important diseases.'
The cautionary response against DDT was delayed further for a number
at 238-63. The key problem according to economists is that pesticides are under-priced if the costs
of long-term, collective use are ignored. Of course, these costs were rarely clear at the outset of
pesticide manufacture and they were incurred outside the marketplace.
63. See, e.g., Battista, The Conviction of DDT, 3 ENvr'L REP. (monograph No. 14 Jan. 26,
1973); Davis, The Deadly Dust, 22 AM. HERITAGE 44 (1971); W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK,
155-73 (1976).
64. It was 15 years before the use of DDT resulted in actual injuries. Rodgers, supra note 4. For
quantitative evidence of the delayed reporting of costs versus benefits, see HADWIGER, supra note

31, at 162-67.
65. E.g., DUNLAP, supra note 2, at 61.
66. See, e.g., PERKINS, supra note 2, at 12; Whitaker, supra note 2, at ch. 12.
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of other reasons. At the time, pesticides could not be kept from the market
place. The available legal recourse had evolved in response to the import
restrictions sparked off by excessive arsenic residues:67 provided pesticides were effective they were made available for unrestricted use. It was
the residues appearing on food destined for human consumption that could
be limited by administrative action. Acting largely on the basis of its
experience in setting arsenic residue levels," the Food and Drug Administration [FDA] in 1946 set the same threshold for DDT, as for arsenic,
of 7 ppm in food products. The FDA also established a "zero tolerance"
for DDT in milk, due to the importance of milk in the diet of infants and
invalids.69
These FDA regulatory actions were imposed swiftly. They seemed
stringent at the time because DDT was believed to be considerably less
toxic than lead arsenate, the notorious chemical it superceded. However,
analogizing DDT to arsenic turned out to be seriously misleading. As we
later found out, DDT's behavior in the environment was dissimilar and
its toxic effects were novel. Arsenic salts left residues when sprayed
directly onto food, but they were otherwise immobile in the environment,
due to their insolubility. Moreover, arsenic residues could be removed
from food by careful washing. DDT proved to be entirely different. 7 As
a synthetic organic, DDT is oil soluble so it is selectively incorporated
into and retained by fatty tissues, which in turn, makes it highly mobile
in the environment. DDT is also chemically persistent and thus likely to
concentrate in organisms high on the food chain. When DDT was introduced, this chemical bio-concentration behavior was unknown, so it was
unimaginable that DDT contamination would cause egg-shell thinning in
some species of birds. 7 Experience with first-generation pesticides had
provided no basis on which to anticipate the problems with DDT and
other synthesized chemicals. Indeed, the understandable but incorrect
analogy between DDT and arsenic created a false sense of security and
delayed the critical examination of DDT.
We simply did not understand the chronic adverse impacts of DDT.
The necessarily truncated war-time testing had not adequately assessed
the potential impacts of long-term, low-level exposure. Even with ex67. See, e.g., Anderson, Pioneer Statute: The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 13 J. PuB. L.
189 (1964); C. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION OF THE NEW DEAL (1970); J. TURNER, THE
CHEMICAL FEAST (1970); Whitaker, supra note 2, WHORTON, supra note 2.
68. The tendency to apply older technology to new problems with very different conditions is
discussed by C. HOOD, THE LIMrrs OF ADMINISTRATION, ch. 5 (1976) (citing Katzenbach, The Horse
Cavalry in the Twentieth Century, 1958 PUB. POL'Y 120 (1958)).
69. See FED. SECURITY AD., FOOD & DRUG AD., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FDA 6 (1946); Notice
of Hearing, 21 C.F.R. § 120 (1949), WHORTON, supra note 2, at 246-47.
70. E.g., Blodgett, supra note 2, at 200-201.
71. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DDT, OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS (1975).
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tensive use, these costs did not show immediately. Knowledge of DDT's
effects evolved slowly, and then largely because of the independent development of more sensitive techniques in analytical chemistry which
made it possible to detect and measure the minute levels of pesticide
residue that had become dispersed widely beyond their sites of application.72 A thousand-fold increase in detection sensitivity made administrative and scientific nonsense of the FDA's "zero tolerance" for DDT in
milk." Whereas residues had previously gone undetected, around 1960
it became increasingly apparent that wildlife contamination and human
exposure were virtually universal. Only as the methods of detection improved could the science of toxicology evolve. Toxicology was not then
sufficiently advanced to definitively assess the significance of DDT exposures. The necessary information did not exist, and its development
was to prove expensive and time consuming.
Competing manufacturers had little interest in incurring additional expenses for testing, and the law did not require them to do so. The costs
of pesticide contamination were largely experienced outside the farm
situation, so both the agricultural and pesticide producing sectors lacked
incentives to reconsider their economically rational transactions.74 Hence,
the role of data collection fell by default to the government. A certain
amount of inertia had to be surmounted before funding was forthcoming.
In 1962, after successive improvements in instrumentation and years of
investigation by concerned wildlife biologists, it was Rachel Carson who
dramatically pointed to our woeful lack of knowledge. She called for
systematic research on the environmental and chronic health impacts of
pesticide contamination. While expressions of public concem soon waned,
Carson's lasting legacy was the private and federal research effort stimulated by the official reaction to Silent Spring." By the late-1960s DDT
and a number of other synthetic pesticides were discovered to cause cancer
in laboratory animals.76
72. See, e.g., Blodgett, supra note 2, at 221-22; DUNLAP, supra note 2, at 135-37; LOWRANCE,
supra note 63, at 2 1. See generally, Post, Chemistry and the Law: A Review of Recent Developments,
2 HARV. ENVTh. L. REV. 523 (1977).
73. "Zero-tolerance" was defined in operational terms as any residue level that was below the
detection threshold. Hence, the concept became unworkable as detection sensitivity increased.As
detection technology improved, previously tolerated contamination levels became illegal. E.g.,

BomtFv, supra note 4, at 208-09.
74. Farmers were directly affected by some "costs" of pesticides, e.g., persistent insecticides
adversely impacted bees and native pollinators, and grapes were hypersensitive to herbicide drift.
These internal on-farm costs were some of the aspects of pesticides use to be effectively regulated.
75. CARSON, supra note 4. For analyses of Carson's work, see Blodgett, supra note 2, at 21315; P. BROOKS, THE HOUSE OF LIFE (1972); DUNLAP supra note 2, at 105-113; F. GRAHAM, StNCE
SiLTrr SPRING (1970); HADWIGER, supra note 31, at ch. 5; PERKINS, supra note 2, at 31-33; J.
PRIMACK & F. VON HIPPEL, ADVICE AND DISSENr 42-43 (1974); A. SCHNAIBERG, THE ENVIRONMENT:
FROM SURPLUS TO SCARCITY (1980).
76. E.g., PRIMACK & VON HIPPEL, supra note 75, at 133; Rodgers, supra note 4.
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Only after three decades of extensive use had exposed all humans did
the scientific.case against DDT became reasonably clear. In sharp contrast,
the initial deployment of that new technology had been a military necessity, an essential humanitarian act in the face of debilitating diseases,
and a continuing economic certainty for highly competitive agriculture.
In hindsight, it is easy to argue that greater initial caution was warranted.
Some people did. It must be remembered that our experience with postWWII chemical technology has taught us what is now known and taken
for granted. But once the chemical genie was unleashed, several factors
operated against easy containment. It has taken time to translate knowledge about hazards into political action. The law has difficulty staying
abreast of rapid technological change where the costs cannot be anticipated, are slow to be manifested, and ultimately remain uncertain.
The Biological Treadmill
While the adverse environmental and health effects of the organochlorine insecticides such as DDT were largely external to the farm setting,
their heavy use eventually imposed other costs directly upon farmers who
sprayed. The biological processes called forth by insecticide use have
often necessitated that farmers subsequently make even larger and more
frequent applications of these chemicals. The details of this syndrome
vary depending on the particular combination of crop, pest, insecticide,
and history of use, among other variables. But the eventual outcome is
remarkably uniform. The net result of insecticide use has frequently been
analogous to the process of drug addition: initial uses were followed by
successively larger doses, then by troubled dependence, and eventually
by some type of crisis."
The mechanisms by which agricultural ecosystems respond to chemically-induced disruptions are now reasonably well understood. Simply,
these mechanisms include insect pest resurgence, secondary pest outbreaks, and genetically-acquired resistance. Resurgence occurs when an
insecticide eliminates the natural enemies (predatory or parasitic insects)
of a pest species, and the surviving pest individuals quickly regain or
surpass their initial numbers. Secondary pests are those potential pest
77. The analogy of pesticide use to drug addition is by no means perfect. Since the 1940s, crop
losses due to insect pests have doubled, in spite of a 10-fold increase in insecticide use. However,
agricultural productivity rose more rapidly than pest losses. Pimentel, supra note 9, at 778-79. For
general overviews of the declining effectiveness of pesticides, see CARSON, supra note 4, at chs.
15, 16; Coaker, Crop Pest Problems Resulting from Chemical Control, in ORIGINS, supra note 15,
at 313; P. DEBACH, BIOLOGICAL CONTROL BY NATURAL ENEMIES, at 1-22 (1974); DETIER, supra
note 2, at 105-32; PERKINS, supra note 2; R. RUDD, PESTICIDES AND THE LIVING LANDSCAPE, 14148, 186-95, 268-79 (1964). For a more recent development, see Fox, Soil Microbes Pose Problems
for Pesticides, 221 SCIENCE 1029 (1983).
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species that suddenly attain harmful densities after their natural enemies,
which had previously kept them scarce, have been killed by an insecticide.
Pesticide resistance is the phenomenon caused when repeated selective
pressure leaves a surviving population with an immunity to that chemical. 7"
Ironically, the very effectiveness of second generation insecticide technology predisposed it to these modes of failure. But it was some time
before the rural sector acknowledged these problems. When secondary
pests began to appear, instead of abandoning insecticides, farmers became
even more dependent on them in a treadmill effect. 79 The dramatic successes initially offered by insecticides encouraged farmers to forego a
variety of cultural practices that helped to suppress insect pests before
the advent of effective, easily-applied chemicals."0 By coming to rely
largely on chemical technology, agriculture made itself especially vulnerable to the failures of insecticides. The broad spectrum of activity that
characterized the early synthetic insecticides meant that they killed both
beneficial and harmful insects indiscriminately. Resurgent, or secondarilycreated pest outbreaks were then suppressed with more frequent and more
massive applications. Abandonment of cultural practices and heavy reliance upon single, effective methods of pest control intensified the selective pressure, and thereby accelerated the onset of genetic resistance.
Resistance was met by using different but equally indiscriminate pesticides. When those methods failed, various combinations of chemicals
were used and so on. 8'
The failure of broad-spectrum insecticides was another hidden cost of
the technology, but unlike the uncertain risks inherent in widespread
contamination, this cost was experienced primarily by the farmers themselves. For farmers who perceived the limitations of pesticides there was
no simple escape, because the biological processes of resistance only
compounded the economic tyranny of the treadmill in agricultural technology. Single farms contribute little to the onset of pesticide resistance,
so individual farmers have little incentive to modify their pest control
78. In several instances resistance developed very rapidly. It was recorded before WWII, and it
was well known to science by the late 1950s. Brown, The Progression of Resistance Mechanisms
DevelopedAgainst Insecticides in PESTICDE CHEMISTRY INTHE 20th CENTuRY (J. Plimmer ed. 1977).
See also, supra note 57; Georghiou, The Evolution of Resistance to Pesticides, 3 ANN. Rlv. ENTOMOLOGY
122 (1972); Hueth & Regev, supra note 10; PERKINS, supra note 2, at 34-37; Pimentel, supra note
9, at 779. On weed resistance to herbicides, see LE BARON & GRESSEL, supra note I.
79. E.g., VAN DEN BoscH, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
80. E.g., PERKINS, supra note 2, at 11-12. The com rootworm may be effectively controlled by

crop rotation. However, in the Midwest the alternative crop is soy beans which are not presently as
profitable, See Lazarus, supra note 54; PERKINS, supra note II, at 89-90. Acreage limitations set
by the government also reinforced farmer's abandonment of cultural practices that suppress insect
pests.
81. E.g., PERKINS, supra note 2, at 21, 37.
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practices even though collectively their actions lead to declining profitability."2 Once entire regions of expansive monoculture had been disrupted
in this manner, there was often no retreat at all for the individual (by
now credit-dependent), except to switch to another (less-profitable) crop
or to abandon farming altogether.83 Alternative methods were sought
primarily when the failure of insecticides left insurmountable pest problems that literally threatened the economy of entire regions."
This biological treadmill effect was a conspicuous cause of our growing
use of pesticides through the 1950s and the '60s, but it also precipitated
a reassessment of the accepted practices. It has been suggested that internal failings of the technology ". . . were ultimately more important
in forcing change" than the external protest over environmental contamination and health risks.85 It is not easy to disentangle these influences
and determine their relative strengths. It is clear, however, that both
worked toward the same effect, and the internal failure of pesticides
eventually motivated some university entomologists, corporate farmers,
and certain USDA officials to seek more sophisticated techniques of pest
suppression. However, this shift in attitudes was far from unanimous.'
And even though genetic resistance is now seen as inevitable, chemical
manufacturers have retained their commitment to large-market, broadspectrum, pesticides-which still receive extensive use both within and
outside the U.S.
FOOD PROCESSING, MARKETING, AND CONSUMPTION
Consumer Preferences
When purchasing produce, consumers generally select the items they
find most aesthetically pleasing. Other factors being equal, unblemished
apples sell before those scarred by insects. And large, more colored
oranges outsell their smaller pale rivals even though the latter may have
82. Pest susceptibility to a particular chemical is a common pool resource that invites overexploitation. The attendant social cost of overexploitation is the onset of genetic resistance and declining
pest control. See, Heuth & Regev, supra note 10; Lazarus & Dixon, Agricultural Pests as Common
Property: Control of the Corn Rootworm, 66 AM. J. ECON. 456 (1984); Regev, Gutierrez & Feder,
Pests as a Common Property Resource: A Case Study in Alfalfa Weevil Control, 58 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 186 (1976).
83. Genetic resistance, the perceived loss of effective pest control, does not cause catastrophe if
alternative cash crops are only slightly less profitable than the preferred crop. Compare corn and
soy beans in the Midwest to cotton in the South where alternative crops are not closely profitable.
See Lazarus, & Dixon, supra note 82.
84. See, e.g., Doutt & Smith, supra note 62, at 8-14; PERKINS, supra note 2; at 19, 40-44, 260,

269.
85. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 42.
86. Moreover, some sectors, such as the California citrus industry, had long been committed to
biological pest controls. E.g., Howard, A History of Applied Entomology, 84 SMITHSONIAN MIsc.
COt.IECTION 57, 153-55 (1930),
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superior flavor. Consumer behavior provides the basis for a series of

formal and informal standards that effectively exclude much cosmetically
imperfect produce from the market. Cosmetic imperfections involve superficial damage or alteration of external appearance that does not significantly affect the taste, nutritional value, or storability of produce. 7
Farmers must comply with cosmetic standards or risk having their fruit,

nuts, and vegetables rejected. With comparatively little bargaining power,
growers respond by applying pesticides more frequently than they might
otherwise choose. Thus our own fastidiousness as consumers is said to
contribute substantially to pesticide usage. 8 Doubtless there is much to
the charge, but what little analysis there is on this question suggests that
the causality is at least more complex, and may even be reversed to some
extent.89
Although fresh and processed foods are regulated differently, the outcomes for both farmers and consumers are much the same. The quality

of processed foods, for example, has been regulated by the federal government since the scandals early in this century."° To protect consumers,
the FDA maintains maximum allowable defect levels, which include
tolerances for the presence of insect debris in processed food as it appears

in the market. However, the food processing industry sets unofficial standards that are far more stringent. Processors frequently exceed the FDA
standards by applying them to the raw produce as it comes from the farm,
instead of intended point of regulation-their own cleaned and processed

output. Furthermore, processors often contract growers to provide produce that is virtually free of insects, weeds or pest damage, and they
sometimes stipulate preventative spraying schedules. 9 ' Condemnation of
produce due to insect contamination is a ruinous prospect growers and
87. M. BROWN, R. GARCIA, C. MAGOWAN, A. MILLER, M. MANN, D. PELZER, J. SCHWARTZ & R.
BOSCH, INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFCrs OF FOOD STANDARDS ON PESTICIDE USE 10 (U.S.
EPA CONTRACT 68-01-2602. National Technical Information Service, PB 278-976)(1976)[hereinafter

VAN DEN
BROWN).

88. E.g., DETHIER, supra note 2, at 125-26; PESTICIDES AND HUMAN WELFARE 242, 254 (D. Gunn
& J. Stevens eds. 1976); WELLFORD, supra note 4, at 275.
89. For a discussion of cosmetic standards in fresh produce, see BROWN, supra note 87. This
Van Den Bosch report to EPA elicited concern and vigorous rebuttals. See, e.g.. Walsh, Cosmetic
Standards: Are Pesticides Overused for Appearances Sake? 193 SCI. 744 (1976); Barnes, Pesticide
Use: CAST Review of EPA Report, 194 Sci. 998 (1976); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, supra
note 57, at ch. 7; PERKINS, supra note 2, at 267-68; VAN DEN BOSCH, supra note 4, at ch. 10.
90. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 67; 0. ANDERSON, THE HEALTH OF A NATION (1958); U.
SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906); WHORTON, supra note 2, at 95-132.
91. On the tenuous relationship between "actual needs" and scheduled applications of pesticides,
see, e.g., BROWN, supra note 87; M. GREEN, PESTICIDES-BOOM OR BANE?, at 55-60 (1976);
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE (1975), supra note 15, at 287. In some instances the requirements
of mechanical harvesting and processing means that weeds or molds cannot be tolerated. Bundy,
Consumer Expectation and Innovation in Processed Food Production, in ORIGINS, supra note 15,
at 227.
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processors can ill afford. When the processor exceeds federal standards
farmers have no option but to comply.
As with fresh produce, however, the real driving force is likely to be
competition within the food industry. Food packers and processors use
quality standards to reduce their own need for wasteful cleaning and
culling, and to restrict the quantity they must buy from contracted growers
in high-yielding years. 92 Thus, processors facing stiff competition shift
costs back to the farmer to avoid being squeezed between their own fixed
costs of processing and transportation, and the inelastic market demand
for food. Processors also fear that consumers will turn to rival products
(including increasingly available fresh produce) if cosmetically-damaged,
or microscopically-defiled merchandise is encountered.93 As the industry
complied with, and actually exceeded existing FDA standards, the regulators have only compounded matters by periodically increasing the
stringency of their defect action levels so as not to lag too far behind
industry performance. Hence, by regulating harmless insect debris to
absurdly low levels, the federal government actively contributes to excessive pesticide use and thereby contravenes its other mandate-to minimize pesticide residues in food. 4
Cosmetic perfection in food is thus a logical outcome in our economic
system, given the technical utility of pesticides, the relatively inflexible
demand for food, and the strong tendency toward overproduction. However, it is in food advertising that the image of cosmetic perfection reaches
it pinnacle, and presumably works its influence on consumer preferences.
Only recently has our massive isolation from the land, and the advent of
TV provided opportunities for food packers, processors and supermarkets
to "create" demands that have little to do with fundamental nutritional
qualities.95 It is not an inevitable human trait to desire visibly immaculate
but less-than-wholesome food. This demand is a consequence of our
technical capabilities and our urbanized capitalist system.
Whatever the complex origins of cosmetic standards, they have a number of adverse implications including greater reliance upon pesticides."
92, E.g., BROWN, supra note 87. See generally, J. HIGHTOWER, EAT YouR HEART OuT: FOOD
PROFITEERING IN AMERICA (1975). In low-yielding years processors appear to lower their own standards accordingly, but this behavior is not well documented.
93. E.g., DETHiER, supra note 2, at 126.
94, Pimentel, Terhume, Dritschilo, Gallahan, Kinner, Nafuss, Peterson, Zareh, Misiti & HaberSchaim, Pesticides, Insects in Food, and Cosmetic Standards, 27 BIOSCIENCE 178 (1977) [hereinafter
Standards]. For similarly confused policy intentions in Britain, see Southwood, Pesticide Usage,

Prodigal or Precise? 3 BRIT.

CROP PROTECTION CONF.-PESTS

& DISEASES,

PROCEEDINGS

603, 607

(1979).
95. Retailers must do more than simply sell produce to attract customers away from competitors.
Brown, An Orange is an Orange, 17 ENV'T 6 (May 1975).
96. Much only superficially defective fresh and processed food is kept from consumers. This
wastage, together with the necessity of heavier pesticide use, means higher production costs and
perhaps lower returns for some farmers. But where commodities face an inelastic demand, eliminating
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Furthermore, the outward appearance of perfection, obtained through
higher pesticide usage, implies an added, although inconspicuous, threat
to health. Worse than elevating our dependence on pesticides, high cosmetic standards actively inhibit the use of alternative pest-suppression
strategies. The omnipresent threat of crop-rejection due to a minimal
presence of insects or their damage meant that farmers were understandably reluctant to utilize alternative controls, and it remained economic
suicide for them to adopt these biological methods unilaterally. Cosmetic
standards in food not only forced farmers to spray heavily, but by maintaining obstacles to the alternatives, they assured that this situation continued.97
OBSTACLES TO THE ALTERNATIVES AND TO PUBLIC RESEARCH
Barriersto the Alternatives
Unlike the second-generation pesticides which had many factors operating in their favor, alternative pest-suppression methods must surmount
serious barriers to their initial discovery and scientific development, and
then to their acceptance and use by farmers. The alternatives to relying
solely on repeated applications of broad-spectrum synthetic pesticides are
not easily characterized because they are diverse. They involve various
combinations of techniques, among which are: biological control by naturally-occurring or artificially-augmented predators, parasites and diseases; cultural practices that interfere with pest survival and reproduction
or facilitate biological controls; plant breeding for pest-resistance in crops;
routine monitoring of insect populations in the field to allow minimallydisruptive and well-timed applications of conventional pesticides; and use
of highly-specific, biologically-rational chemicals or processes that mimic
the pest's own chemical signals and thereby pre-empt successful reproduction.
The common strategy is to rely simultaneously upon the careful integration of many different techniques, and not on one technique heavily
enough to induce genetic resistance. The unifying objective is to suppress
pest populations to levels just below their threshold for economic damage.
Known as integrated pest management [IPM],98 this approach and its
excess supplies may be rational for growers if by preventing precipitous price collapses it maintains
farm incomes. Indeed there is evidence suggesting that cosmetic standards are sometimes used for
such purposes. BROWN, supra note 87.
97. BRowN, supra note 87; Standards, supra note 94.
98. For an excellent review of IPM strategies, see PERKINS, supra note 2. He also distinguished
IPM from Total Population Management [TPM] where the objective is regional eradication; see infra
note 107 and accompanying text. See also DEBACH, supra note 77; M. FLINT & R. VAN DEN BOSCH,
ltetot4ucnoN To INr wrAEO PeST MANAGEmENr (1981); HuFFAKER, supra note 62; NEw TECHNOLOGY
OF PEST CONTROL (C. Huffaker ed. 1980); R. VAN DEN BOSCH, P. MESSENGER &A. GuTtERREZ, AN
INTRODUCTION TO BIOLOGICAL CONTROL

(1981).
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variants have proved extremely effective in many instances, and they

almost always result in reductions of both pesticide use and the costs of
agricultural production." Despite an impressive history of successes, and
considerable potential for reducing pesticide use through new developments in IPM, by 1970 these alternatives remained a conceptual strategy
more than a widely-applied method of control." °
The development of these new pest control strategies was impeded by
serious economic constraints stemming from biological and institutional
sources. Each of the alternatives suffers from one or more of the following
problems. First, IPM solutions usually apply to a narrow range of situ-

ations-often to a single pest species, region or crop. Such narrow applicability confines their potential market. Second, IPM programs necessitate
detailed knowledge of the complex dynamics within entire agro-ecosys-

tems and consideration of various techniques in combination, instead of
relatively simple data on the susceptibility of single target species to a
limited number of chemicals and doses. Hence, their discovery tends to
require large commitments, including costly international searches for
useful predators, parasites and diseases, or other bio-rational methods. "0Research-intensive methods require proportionately large markets

if private development is to occur. Third, many IPM techniques involve
living organisms and cultural practices that are not readily patented, thus

further reducing the incentives for private research. This hurdle is occasionally surmounted, for instance, when beneficial insects need regular
augmentation from commercially-raised populations, when IPM knowhow can be sold as a service, and when a bacterium or bio-rational
chemical offers to control pests of considerable economic significance.
Even so, any additional burden for testing imposed by the government
prior to registration can and has quickly discouraged private investors." 2
Because they are highly-specific, knowledge-intensive, or nonpatentable, the IPM alternatives are logical candidates for public sector sponsorship. 3 Indeed, most of the environmentally-benign alternatives already
99. E.g., HUtFAKER (1980), supra note 98, at 21; PERKINS, supra note 2, at 89. Among the
successes of IPM are impressive biological controls of exotic weed infestations -including Klamath
weed in California, and Opuntia in Australia.
100. See, e.g., VAN DEN BOSCH, supra note 4, at 173; PERKINS, supra note 2. An important
exception was the California citrus industry. Howard, supra note 86.
101. There are numerous examples where beneficial insects from overseas have been successfully
introduced. DEBACH, FLINT& VAN DEN BOSCH, HUFFAKER, VAN DEN BOSCH, MESSENGER & GUTIERREZ,
supra note 98. Some bio-rational techniques do not involve imported organisms. A notable example
was the mass release of sterilized male Screw Worm Flies. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 97.
102. See, e.g., Djerassi, Shih-Coleman, & Diekman, Insect Control of the Future, 186 Sci. 586
(1974); PERKINS, supra note 2, at 203, 282; Tucker, supra note 59; WELLFORD, supra note 4, at
280-92.
103. E.g., Ruttan, Changing Role of Public and Private Sectors in AgriculturalResearch, SC.
23 (1982). This case for public sector funding of IPM research is further strengthened since many
of the of the benefits of IPM are collectively shared outside the farm sector, by the entire population
of consumers. In contrast is the commercial attraction of genetic engineering, e.g., Buttel, supra
note 34, at 92-94.
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in existence emerged from land-grant colleges and USDA laboratories.
While clientele-oriented research on pest control has always flourished,
the government's emphasis on nonchemical methods has necessarily been
erratic. WWII seriously curtailed activity in this promising area. Hostilities closed down the search in foreign countries for bio-control agents.
Wartime priorities redirected research, funding and personnel toward
chemical techniques that promised immediate war-related pay-offs. Once
the war intervened, other factors compounded the attrition. Broad-spectrum pesticides had proved so enormously successful that alternatives
seemed entirely unnecessary, and research entomologists were understandably infatuated by the opportunities for funding and career development in chemical-related research."'4 Moreover, the pesticide industry
has never been enamored of government-subsidized research into techniques that would compete with chemical sales. 5 Hence, funding for
the biological control did not recover to pre-war levels until after 1950. "
Recovery began only after the belated appearance of problems associated
with pesticide use-their external costs (environmental contamination,
health hazards) and their internal failures (resurgence, pest creation, resistance). Moreover, USDA and university researchers were strongly divided over how best to get off the treadmill created by these insecticide
failures. Without a united front, the profession was less effective than it
might have been in advocating rapid investigation and development of
the alternatives, and thus reductions in our chemical dependence. 0 7 IPM
research finally received substantial federal funding early in the 1970s."os
Following an IPM development, the next serious barrier was convincing
farmers to use such pesticide-sparing methods.
Farmers have been reluctant to adopt available IPM technology for
several reasons. First, the economics of pest damage and crop protection
are intrinsically uncertain so it was by no means clear to the fanner that
alternatives held the advantage.'" Second, IPM approaches do not eliminate the pest species but maintain them at levels below their threshold
for damage. The concept that previously ruinous pests should not be
eradicated was unsettling for financially-extended farmers. Third, production loans and growers contracts frequently required pesticide appli104. Indicative of the transition to chemical research, papers on the biology and biological control
of pests reported in the J. EcoN. ENTOMOLOGY fell from 33% in 1937 to 17% in 1947, while space
devoted to chemical testing rose from 58% to 76%. Jones, Agricultural Entomology, in HISTORY OF
ENTOMOLOGY 307, 326 (F. Smith, T. Mittler & C. Smith eds. 1973).
105. E.g., PERKINS, supra note 2, at 68, 203-204.
106. See, e.g., DUNLAP, supra note 2, at 73; HADWIGER, supra note 31, at 165; PERKINS, supra
note 2, at 68.
107. Letter to author from Professor John H. Perkins, Dean of Science, Evergreen State College,
Olympia, WA. (Jan. 27, 1985). See also PERKINS, supra note 2.
108. See, HADWIGER, supra note 31, at 166; PERKINS, supra note 2, at 85-89, 61-160.
109. Supra note 10 and accompanying text. Moreover, diffusing technical innovations is generally
problematic, almost always exhibiting a threshold. See E. ROGERS WITH F. SHOEMAKER, COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS (1971).
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cations. Fourth, cosmetic quality standards that call for produce virtually
free of insects and pest damage discourage IPM strategies. Fifth, IPM
occasionally requires cooperation between farmers because the technique
is not interchangeable with chemical use on a small scale and because
farmers cannot unilaterally defy informal grade standards for cosmetic
perfection."' Sixth, because IPM generally necessitates regular monitoring of insect populations, it implies both additional labor and expertise
which farmers are sometimes reluctant to acquire."' Finally, the complexity and subtlety of IPM means that education is extremely important,
yet many of the channels open to farmers are saturated with news about
chemical innovations---channels
that are economically and ideologically
2
inimical toward IPM."1
Collectively these features of IPM considerably disadvantaged its commercial adoption, while pesticides continued to meet farmers' needs." 3
Chemicals are purchased in discrete quantities related exactly to needs.
They require no cooperation with one's competitors or with government.
They provide relatively inexpensive insurance against crop failure or
market rejection, and their application requires little labor or information.
As Perkins," 4 observes, "Chemicals also provided the illusion of complete mastery over nature: spray and your enemy was dead, usually before
your very eyes." Therefore it is not surprising that the alternatives, which
avoid relying solely on pesticides, have largely been adopted in situations
where economically threatening pests were either intrinsically beyond the
reach of conventional pesticide technology, or where insecticide failure
after initial successes left insurmountable problems that literally threatened the economy of entire regions.' Even today farmers do not commonly adopt environmentally-benign, but less convenient, and more laborintensive alternatives because they wish to reduce the social costs implicit
in chemical use. So long as chemicals remain effective, they alone are
the pest suppression technique best suited to the political, social and
philosophical underpinnings of our highly-competitive, capital-intensive,
and individualistic form of agriculture." 6
110. Supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. See also Hall, The Profitability of Integrated
Pest Management, 23 BULL. ENToMoLoGY Soc. AM. 267 (1977). In situations where uncooperative
neighbors continued applying chemicals extensively, the disruption to insect populations in surrounding areas jeopardized IPM programs. Highly individualistic farmers do not take readily to IPM
plans for coordinated action, and in these instances the transaction costs have exceeded the capacity
of existing institutions.
11l. Hall, supra note 110.
112. E.g., VAN DEN BOSCH, supra note 4, at ch. 13.
113. Cf. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 260.
114. Id.
115. Supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
116. PERKINS, supra note 2,at 265-87.
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HURDLES TO RESTRICTING CHEMICALS ALREADY IN USE
Irresolvable Technical Uncertainty over the Risks
The risks inherent in pesticide use are usually unclear or poorly defined,
even after there has been sufficient time and funding for scientists to

gather relevant information. Whenever technical uncertainty over reputed
adverse impacts cannot be resolved, the interests that benefit from a
chemical's use can legitimately argue against the imposition of restraints

by government (they may also ridicule and harass scientists who try to
amass the case against their pesticides).' ' Consequently, irresolvable
doubt about costs means that pesticides remain in use longer than they
might otherwise.

The question of whether a pesticide causes cancer in humans, for
instance, seems simple enough, but for several reasons we are usually
unable to answer such questions from the strictly scientific viewpoint." 8

In attempting to resolve these matters it is first necessary to demonstrate
that exposure occurs. Following three decades of heavy DDT use, there
was still some technical debate over whether the residues detected by
available instruments were actually DDT or PCBs-another persistent

and ubiquitous environmental contaminant." 9 Second, once it has been
established that we are exposed and that DDT is ubiquitous in human
adipose tissue, it must also be shown that such exposures actually have
harmful consequences, such as cancer production. Analysis shows that
it is unlikely this question will ever be definitively answered by science. "

It is extremely difficult to prove that something causes cancer in humans.' 2 ' Even in such seemingly obvious cases as cigarette smoking,

decades of expensive research have merely established a statistically117. E.g., supra note 75 and accompanying text. Many critics see these instances as evidence
of conspiracy, but like everyone else, the agri-chemical lobby is "inextricably bound up in its own
need for symbolic reassurance". Wynne, Redefining the Issues of Risk and Social Acceptance, 15
FtrunS 13, 24 (1983). Even pesticide critics have manipulated data in a manner consistent with
their ideology. E.g., Maclntyre, A Case Study: An Outsider's View of the DDT Decision paper
prepared for the Environmental Studies Board, National Academy of Sciences (1975). See generally
Rushefsky, Technical Disputes: Why Experts Disagree, I POL'Y STUD. REV. 676, 679 (1982); Miller,
Psychosocial Origins of Conflict Over Pest Control Strategies, 12 AGRIC., EcOsYSTEM, & ENV'T 235
(1985). In many instances the costs of technology are nevertheless bome disproportionately by the
weak and disorganized.
118. Comparable doubts existed about most of DDT's reputed ill-effects on wildlife and the
environment.
119. E.g., DUNLAP, supra note 2, at 135, 168, 188.
120. Such answerable questions have been termed "trans-scientific". Weinberg, Science and
Trans-science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972). See also Blodgett, supra note 2, at 273-74; Green, The
Resolution of Uncertainty, 12 NAT. REs. J. 182 (1972); McGarity, Substantive and Procedural
Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions, 67 GEo. L. J. 729 (1979);
Rushefsky, supra note 117; Tversky & Kahneman, Judgement Under Uncertainty, 185 Sc. 1124
(1974).
121. E.g., LOWRANCE, supra note 63, at 12-74.
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significant correlation and not the precise cause of lung cancer."' In the
case of DDT, the data on existing human exposures are subject to several
unresolvable doubts, and experiments with laboratory animals are of
questionable relevance to the human situation.'23 Without proof of harm
to humans, those opposing pesticides are left strategically weakened in
a society whose legal structure is committed to technically-driven economic growth.
The Law of Nuisance
Not only were the critics placed at a political disadvantage by the
scientific difficulty of proving, among other things, that DDT disrupted
bird populations and caused cancer in humans, the law was against them
as well. Policy questions involving technical doubt always presuppose
some allocation of the burden of proof. Whenever an issue is sufficiently
uncertain that a case cannot be conclusively proven on either side, the
party with the burden of proof automatically loses. Since that burden fell
on the critics, technical uncertainty had the more serious consequence of
precluding legal remedies against DDT use,12 even though it had by then
dispersed and accumulated in wildlife throughout the entire planet.
This tremendous bias, the common law of nuisance, was incorporated
into the statutory law covering pesticides, implicitly at first, but then with
increasing clarity: the Insecticide Act of 1910 was exclusively concerned
that farmers should not be defrauded by ineffective or adulterated products.' 25 So long as these chemicals were effective against pests, various
122. For decades, cigarette manufacturers have contested the evidence against tobacco smoking.
See, A. FRrrScHLER, SMOKING AND POLrrncs (1983).
123. See, e.g., Consolidated DDT Hearings, 37 Fed. Reg. 13,369-13,376 (1972); Weinberg,
supra note 120.
124. The legal allocation of burdens is crucial to understanding why second-generation pesticides
received such unrestrained use. Traditional burdens of proof evolved in the courts during the era
when industrial development, economic growth, and westward expansion were being greatly encouraged. E.g., Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 105-22 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970). A person who challenged an enterprise had
the burden of showing actual or impending harm to himself in order to obtain injunctive relief. W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 587 (4th ed. 1971); 42 AM. JUR. 2d INJUNcrIoNs 587
§ 39 (1969). For critiques of the burden of proof, see Note, Imminent Irreparable Injury: A Need
for Reform, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 1025 (1972); Comment, The Burden of Proof in California Environmental Nuisance Cases, 9 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 679 (1976). If the plaintiff could meet the
heavy burden of proof, he was then required to show that his loss outweighed any -inconvenience
to the entrepreneur and any detriment to the community-at-large. For critiques of this subsequent
balancing of interests, see Note, Right to Injunction in a Private Suite, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 549
(1971); Note, Injuctive Relief Denied in Private Action for Nuisance Caused by Industrial Polluter,
45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 919 (1970). On the significance of reversing these burdens, see Carmichael,
Strict Liability in Tort - An Explosion in Products Liability Law, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 528 (1971); R.

EPSTEIN, A THEORY

OF STRICT LIABILITY

(1980). The burden of proof and this balancing of interests

precluded suits against uncertain, long-term pesticide hazards so long as agricultural benefits and
public health purposes could be shown.
125. Supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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laws actually encouraged innovation by providing patents, by sanctioning
the presence of minimal residues in food, and by requiring strict proof
of causation from those who claimed the technology harmed them. The
statute was rewritten in 1947 to require federal registration of all "economic poisons" in order to more effectively protect farmers and homeowners against useless materials and unscrupulous sales. Fearing such a
veto power over their profits, the manufacturers conceded to federal
licensing only after the bill was modified to explicitly place the burden
of proof on government.' 26 Hence, new products would be registered
automatically, "under protest" if necessary, until the USDA could show
in court that a product was ineffective.
Sixteen years later, in 1963, after concerns for pesticide hazards finally
reached the social agenda, the provision for protest registration was eliminated. However, Congress kept the evidentiary burden on government
by providing manufacturers with three successive opportunities for appeal. While observers have commonly assumed that those amendments
reversed the burden of proof, it was not until 1971 that a federal judge
actually accomplished this reversal-in a deftly concealed sleight of hand. 127
Even then, the government continued to bear a considerable evidentiary
burden, and it must still weigh costs against benefits when deciding for
or against a pesticide. In those instances when administrators either want
to keep or remove pesticides from the marketplace, they face an almost
insurmountable burden. This is because the facts are rarely conclusive
and the standards against which available evidence must be evaluated are
themselves unclear and contradictory. 121 So, a significant outcome of these
long-established rules of evidence was to encourage the invention and
use of chemical pest suppression. This was accomplished simply by
protecting pesticides from their detractors through a legal procedure. 2 9
Obstacles to Gathering Environmental Intelligence
In addition to such unresolvable questions and this heavy burden of
proof, the collection of information on the environmental and health
effects of pesticide use is by no means automatic. Some of the factors
126. The legislative history of the statute clearly shows that the manufacturers wanted protection
against fraudulent dealers and the growing variety of state regulations. Whitaker, supra note 2, at
ch. 12.
127. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckleshaus, 439 F2d 584 (D.C. Cir., 1971). For an analysis
of this case, the legislative history of "protest" registration and the Court's manipulation of that
history, see MacIntyre, A Court Quietly Rewrote the FederalPesticide Statute, 7 L. & POL'Y 249
(1985). Congress subsequently ratified this judge-made law with the passage of FEPCA in 1972.
128. For a brief review see MacIntyre, Administrative Initiative and Theories of Implementation:
Federal Pesticide Policy, 1970-1976, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, 4 PUBLIC
POLICY STUDIES: A MULTI-VOLUME TREATISE 205, 211 (H. Ingram & K. Godwin eds. 1985).
129. See also Junger, A Recipe for Bad Water: Welfare Economics andNuisance Law Mixed Well
27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1976).
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that complicate and delay intelligence gathering have been mentioned
already: relative to their conspicuous benefits, the adverse impacts of
pesticides are slow to materialize, sometimes entirely unanticipatable,
and often socially inconspicuous even after scientific discovery.'3 0
Pesticide residues in food are invisible to the unaided senses, their
effects on wildlife are usually subtle and the human health questions are
often unanswerable. Consequently growth in our understanding of the
costs of pesticide use depended upon unrelated improvements in the
sensitivity of detection instruments, independent research on wildlife populations, and Rachel Carson's ability to tip the political scales toward the
costly funding of long-term feeding studies with laboratory animals by
sources outside the agriculture arena. In addition to the expense, such
research takes five or more years to complete, and was itself undergoing
continual refinements in protocol. Also, the nascent ability to define and
assess potential costs of pesticides was being inundated by the rate at
which new chemicals were introduced into commerce. Moreover, pesticides are applied in highly dispersed and very decentralized settings that
are not easily observed. While the health consequences of the more toxic
pesticides can be immediate and very obvious to those occupationally
exposed, farmworkers are neither well situated to remedy their own dilemma, nor is their situation easily comprehended by outsiders. 3' These
intrinsic features of pesticide use make the study of its consequences
difficult and expensive.
It is possible to distinguish conceptually between the foregoing, largelyincidental hurdles, and deliberate obstruction to the collection of information about the consequences of pesticide use. ' Compounding such
incidential hurdles as cost and invisibility, research into the drawbacks
of pesticides has been further discouraged by professional norms and
occasionally by political obstruction.
The public research establishment evolved in the service of commercial
agriculture.' 3 The tremendous success and apparent safety of synthetic
pesticides were soon bolstered in the following manner: farmers and
pesticide manufacturers provided the USDA and universities with political
support for research on improved pesticide know-how. Congress funded
research on pesticide effectiveness and explicitly discouraged critical research. "' Meanwhile publicly-funded and industry-contracted researchers
130. Supra notes 63-64, 71-72, 118-23 and accompanying text.
131. E.g., Greenstone, Farmworkers in Jeopardy: OSHA. EPA, and the Pesticide Hazard, 5
ECOLOGY L. Q, 69 (1975). See generally R. KAZIS & R. GROSSMAN, FEAR AT WORK: JOB BLACKMAIL,
LABOR. AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1982).

132, On the significance of relative tractability in policy problems, see D. MAZMANIAN & P.
21-25 (1983),
133. Supra notes 32-40, 98-99 and accompanying text. University entomologists working on IPM
alternatives to the pesticide treadmill also shared this utilitarian norm.
134. HADWIGER, supra note 31, at chs. 7, 8.
SABATIER, IMPLEMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
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developed their careers in this lucrative field, becoming experts on, and
champions of chemicals designed to increase the productivity of agriculture 'to feed a starving world'. An important consequence of these
mutually-agreeable interactions was an over commitment of research capability to the discovery, production, and application of chemical technology.13 Relatively few resources were expended to develop less-disruptive
alternatives and even fewer to document the adverse impacts of pesticides.
Funding independent from industry or government was virtually nonexistent. Within the land grant college establishment the narrow focus
on chemical techniques was reinforced through training while the processes of academic peer review used in the funding, scrutiny and publication of research discouraged the expression of doubts about the
beneficence of pesticide technology.
Occasionally these subtle peer pressures on scientific missions became
so overt that political pressures were obviously being applied from outside
the usual processes of academic review. Skeptical scientists have been
harassed, and had their access to publishers threatened or blocked.' 36
National Academy committees have been stacked with production-oriented scientists. 3 ' Government agencies have frustrated research efforts
to evaluate the effectiveness of spray programs even when efficacy was
in doubt. 3 ' Research results critical of pesticides have been unreasonably
delayed from public release.' 39 There has even been serious fabrication
of toxicity test data (including efforts to cover this up) by a private research
facility that relied solely on industry-funded research explicitly intended
to meet regulatory requirements."o Only the blatant attempts at limiting
the scope of conflict are detected while many more go unrecorded. Perhaps
more important than all this deliberate obstruction, and certainly more
continuous in effect, were the subtle and decentralized influences shaping
135. Both research opportunities and scientific manpower were biased toward chemical technology. E.g., SCHNAIBERG, supra note 75, at 277-315.
136. See, e.g., Id.; supra note 117 and accompanying text; GRAHAM, supra note 75; VAN DEN
BOSCH 4, supra note 4, at 55-59, 90-95. For other USDA nonpesticide examples, see HADWIGER,
supra note 31, at 53-54; Buttel, supra note 34. at 89, 91; A. Scm-r, FIRE AND WATER: SCIENIFIC
HERESY IN THE FOREST SERVICE (1962). See generally, Martin, The Scientific Straitjacket: The Power
Structure of Science and the Suppression of Environmental Scholarship, II ECOLOGIST 33 (1981);
Miller, ProfessionalDissent and Environmental Management. 4 ENVIRONMENTALIST 143 (1984).
137. See BoFFEY, supra note 4, at ch. 9; Grobstein, The Role of National Academy of Sciences
in Public Policy and Regulatory Decision Making, in LAW AND SCIENCE IN COLLABORATION (J. Nyhart

& M. Carrow eds. 1983).
138, E.g., The U.S. Forest Service has frustrated scientific efforts to investigate the benefits of
spraying, even when a chemical's efficacy was doubtful. E.g., VAN DEN BOSCH, supra note 4, at
78.
139. E.g., PRIMACK & VON HIPPEL, supra note 75, at 74-86; Kolojeski, FederalAdministrative
Trial of a Carcinogen, ORIGINS OF HUMAN CANCER 1715, 1717 (H, Hiatt, J. Watson & J. Winsten
eds. 1977).
140. See Schneider, Faking It: The Case Against Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, 4 AMICUS J.
14 (No. 4, 1983); IBT-Guilty: How Many Studies are No Good?, 5 AMICUS J. 4 (No. 2, 1983);
Dowie, Foster, Marshall, Weir & King, The Illusion of Safety, 7 MOrER JONES 36 (1982).
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the entire agricultural research agenda, and the sheer rate of pesticide
innovation that continually swamped our limited capacity to assess adverse impacts which are far from obvious or certain. Nevertheless, it is
the extreme examples of coercion or manipulative intrusion against critical
research that fuel, and perhaps justify, fears of some "capitalistic" conspiracy.
When divining the significance of such influences, however, it is important to keep them in perspective. At least two facts mitigate allegations
of an effective conspiracy. First, it is a serious mistake to equate massive
imbalances in the distribution of research capability, on the one hand,
with a consistent ability to convert those superior resources into favorable
policy results. 4' Technical controversies in America are replete with David
and Goliath stories, of which Silent Spring was one. Simply stated, it
does take technical skills and other resources to demolish scientific analyses, but many fewer than are required to construct and defend the original
argument or program.' 4 2 Given sufficient government-sanctioned secrecy,
conspiracy can be effective.' 43 However, with the institution of administrative decisonmaking based upon an open and challengeable record,
relatively weak elements can prevail, or at least exert countervailing
influence disproportionate to their size. Moreover, deliberate obstruction,
once revealed to the public, has sometimes disarmed the corporate giant
in U.S. politics.'" Second, deliberate obstruction of environmental intelligence gathering is but one of many factors that favored pesticide use
over time. Collusive obstruction certainly contributed to the overall picture but without absolving subgovernment conspirators of responsibility
for their part, this analysis suggests that many, and more fundamental,
forces would have operated to much the same effect even if conspiratorial
influences were entirely absent.
LOPSIDED POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONAL BIAS
Veto Power of the Pesticide Subgovernment
The American combination of congressional fragmentation, weak political parties, and delegation of law-writing authority to specialized com141. E.g., Wilson, Democracy and the Corporation, Wall St. J., Jan. II, 1978.
142. H. MARGOLIS, TECHNICAL ADVICE ON POLICY ISSUES 39 (1973).
143. The British utilized secret procedures to reach an opposite conclusion from the United States,
which utilized identical information on the same pesticide considered in open procedures. Gillespie,
Eva & Johnson Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in the United States and Great Britain: The Case of
AIdrin and Dieldrin, 9 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 265 (1979). On the role of secrecy in British government,
see D. ASHFORD, POLICY AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN 16-17 (1981). A contrast similar to British v. U.S.
decisionmaking exists between early USDA and EPA procedures that superseded them.
144. E.g., the United States policymaking tide was reversed following the revelation that General
Motors had spied on Ralph Nader. M. NADEL, THE POLITCS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 137-54
(1971). Generally, Americans are sensitive to perceived inequities in the allocation of burdens and
rewards. G. WALSTER & E. BERSCHEID, EQUITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH (1978).
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mittees has long maximized opportunities for blocking controversial
legislation. Yet chairmen of legislative committees retained considerable
informal power to oversee agencies within their jurisdiction. Unless there
is some concerted showing of outside pressure for change, congressional
committees often defined policy discreetly in collaboration with an administrative bureau and the organized interests deeply affected by its
operations. These tripartite coalitions, or subgovemments, frequently have
the autonomy to adopt and implement seriously biased policies (the agricultural research subsystem is a case in point). 45 Powerful committee
chairmen can protect their clientele, agencies and policies by resisting
undesired initiatives simply with a veto or crippling compromise when
corrective legislation is proposed by outsiders.
The agriculture committees and appropriations subcommittees of Congress routinely attracted members from rural electorates who sought to
engage in the quiet logrolling that provided their constituents with access
to federal largesse. For about one hundred-years these committees have
served commercial agriculture, for example, by creating a clientele-oriented Department of Agriculture [USDA], by providing price supports,
access to cheap labor, protective barriers against imported commodities,
and by fostering the development of improved farm technologies.14 In
the case of pesticide policy, two distinct but complementary subgovernments have sponsored chemical pest suppression techniques first through
favorable appropriations for chemical research, and second by regulating
only against ineffective products and assuring a pro-pesticide bias by
delegating licensing authority to the sympathetic USDA.
For decades these subgovernments made decisions with undisputed
autonomy. 47 Their subject matter attracted little public attention, and even
less interference, from the collective body of Congress, from the White
House, the media, or non-farm groups. When criticisms of pesticides
began surfacing in the late 1950s, each of the agriculture committees
145. For the literature on subgovemment (or "subsystem") policymaking, see D. CATER, POWER
(1964); Davidson, Breaking Up Those 'Cozy Triangles':An Impossible Dream?, in
LEGISLATIVE REFORM AND PUBLIC POLICY 30 (S. Welch & J. Peters eds. 1977); L. DODD & R. SCHoTr,
CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979); J. FREEMAN, THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1965);
FRrrSCHLER, supra note 122; E. GRIFFITH, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE (1961); Lowi, supra
note 22; A. MAASS, MUDDY WATERS (1951); R. RIPLEY & G. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1976). For an excellent account of the historical origins of subgovemments
emphasizing science-based policy, see DUPREE, supra note 29. The growth of public participation
and litigiousness during the 1960s and the 1970s forced subgovernment coalitions to expand their
active support. See, Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in THE NEW AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM (A. King ed. 1978); Wamsley, Policy Subsystems as a Unit of Analysis in Implementation Studies, paper presented at Erasmus University, Rotterdam (June 1983). On the agriculture subgovemment, see Hadwiger, supra note 13, at 506.
146. E.g., Hadwiger, supra note 13, supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Blodgett, supra note 2, at 271; WELLFORD, supra note 4; GRAHAM, supra note
75; Maclntyre, supra notes 127 and 128.
IN WASHINGTON
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effectively shielded and encouraged the USDA policy of unrestrained
pesticide use. This was done by steadfastly blocking policy reforms responsive to emerging knowledge about the hazards and failures inherent
in second-generation chemical technology. 4
The agriculture committees proved especially capable of maintaining
their hegemony over pesticides from WWII through the early 1970s.
Rural interests were heavily over-represented in Congress until the Supreme Court ordered reappointment in 1964. Even after redistricting,
conservative democrats from the rural South continued to dominate the
legislature, particularly the House of Representatives. 149 In particular,

Southerners controlled the entire agriculture jurisdiction in Congress, 'o
so coalition building in agricultural price supports was dominated by
cotton until 1973.

This predominance of conservative Southerners was significant for
pesticide policymaking for two reasons. First, cotton had long been a
148. Blodgett, supra note 2, at 218-20, 271.
149. Due to their long tenure in the single-party South, and a strict seniority system for assigning
committee chairmanships, Southern democrats held a disproportionate number of the important (veto)
positions in Congress. E.g., Rieselbach, LegislativeChange, Reform, and Public Policy, in ENCYLOPEDIA
OF POLICY STUDIES 359, 383. note 5 (S. Nagel ed. 1983); CONGRESS IN CHANGE 74 (N.J. Ornstein
ed. 1975); J. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY 253 (1963); B. HINCKLEY, THE SENIORITY
SYSTEM IN CONGRESS (1970). Thus, the Southern democrats elicited considerable deference from
junior legislators who wanted access to the pork barrel, and from successive presidents who sought
re-election, domestic policy changes, or civil rights reform.
150. See, e.g., Barton, Coalition-Building in the United States House of Representatives: Agricultural Legislation in 1973, in CASES INPUBLIC POLICYMAKING 141 (J. Anderson ed. 1976); Hardin,
Agricultural Price Policy: The Political Role of the Bureaucracy, in THE NEW POLITICS OF FOOD (D.
Hadwiger & W. Browne eds. 1978); MEIER, supra note 14, at 136.
Jamie Whitten (D-Miss.) came to Congress in 1941, joined the House Agriculture Appropriations
Subcommittee the following year, and has chaired it since 1949. He is renowned for exercising
detailed oversight and precise item vetoes in the annual allocation of research funding. E.g., HADWIGER, supra note 31, at ch. 7. In so doing, he has championed the interests of commercial agriculture
in general and cotton growing in particular. He is an ardent defender of pesticides . Indeed, with
industry sponsorship, he authored a vehement rebuttal to Rachel Carson. See, M. GREEN, J. FALLOWS
& D.ZWICK, WHO RUNS CONGRESS 80 ( 1972); J. WHIrEN, THAT WE MAY LIVE(1966). SinceChairman
Whitten's views have long been important and well known in the agricultural research community,
he has presumably encouraged the development and use of chemical pest control and effectively
precluded and delayed research on the costs and failures of pesticides. See, e.g., HADWIGER, supra
note 31, at 125, 137, 163, & 166; RIPLEY & FRANKLIN, supra note 145, at 60-63, 84-85, 115-18.
Congressman Whitten took a particular interest in funding Mirex spraying in the South to combat
the imported fire ant. E.g., Bop-EY, supra note 4, at 211-14; Maney, The Fire Ant Controversy, in
HADWIGER & BROWNE, supra note 150; McGarity, The Death and Transfiguration of Mirex, 3 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 112, note 21; WELLFORD, supra note 4, at 286-309; Wolff, Making Mountains Out
of Fire Ant Mounds, AUDUBON 138, 139 (July 1976).
Also, the House Agricultural Committee was chaired by three Southern democrats between WWII
and 1974. But, the role of individual legislators should not be overemphasized. The structure of
legislative institutions, the nature of interest representation, and the selection and socialization of
members with historically-molded world views can promote policy continuity in the face of seemingly
dramatic shifts of personnel. In 1975, the stability of attitudes in the House Agriculture Committee
was notable even though the chairmanship went to a region outside the South for the first time in
decades.
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mainstay in the relatively undiversified Southern economy, and second,
cotton production experienced perhaps the worst case of pesticide addiction, escalating chemical use, and successive technological failures. "The
production of cotton has utilized more pesticides than any other single
crop in the U.S. since about 1950."'"' Thus, while pesticide policy attracted almost no attention from outsiders, it proved especially salient to
the Southern democrats presiding over both the budget for agricultural
research and the jurisdiction for regulating pesticides.
This conservative, rural continuity left its mark on policymaking. When
the pesticide law was rewritten in 1947 the emphasis remained almost
entirely on providing economic protection for the commercial farmer,
and reputable manufacturers.' 52 Fraudulent sales had mushroomed during
the war. The USDA correctly assumed that its mission was primarily to
assure pesticide users of effective and unadulterated products that were
adequately labelled for safe application.' 5 3 Consumer health was a matter
left to the FDA by setting and enforcing "safe" levels of exposure to
pesticide residues.
Yet, when the furor erupted over previously unknown pesticide impacts,
critics attempted to read into the pesticide statute, the objectives of environmental protection and consumer health. 5 4 Such novel objectives
were not voiced during the legislative history of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA] of 1947.' 5 Throughout the
1960's, the regulatory subgovernment responded to critics with windowdressing but otherwise it refused to restrict pesticide use administratively,
and blocked proposals to amend FIFRA since all such bills were eventually
referred to the agriculture committees. 56Congress has forcibly 'overridden
its agriculture committees on publicly visible and vulnerable matters,
such as sugar and milk subsidies, but pesticide policymaking did not
151. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 40.

152. See, Whitaker, supra note 2, at ch. 12; Dubnick, supra note 28.
153. E.g.. Blodgett, supra note 2; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (1975), supra note 15, at
21.
154. E.g., CARSON, supra note 4; Rodgers, supra note 4; WELLFORD, supra note 4. In fact, the
law governing pesticide use was outdated due to rapid chemical innovation, outmoded understandings
and documentation of the new technology, and archaic burdens imposed by traditional nuisance law.
Blodgett, supra note 2.
155. Whitaker, supra note 2, at ch. 12. A criticism subsequently leveled at the USDA was that,
like the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC], its developmental activities were inconsistent with its
regulatory responsibility. The analogy is very misleading because, unlike the AEC, the 1947 pesticide
statute never did impose comparable regulatory objectives upon the USDA (this happened only in
1970 when a court reinterpreted FIFRA, see, supra note 127). The protection of consumer health
was the focus of an entirely separate statute under which the FDA set tolerances to limit chemical
residues in food (although prior to 1934, the FDA's predecessor bureau had been located within the
USDA).
156. See notes 147, 148 and accompanying text.
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similarly suffer frontal confrontation or defeat.5 7 An important factor
contributing to this continuing deference on pesticide policy, even in the
face of mounting technical evidence of policy failure, was the relative

lack of public concern or organized support for pesticide reform.
Lack of Mobilized Citizen Concern

Ultimately, the imbalance in pesticide use and policymaking, was made
possible by the absence of a broad-based popular opposition. The pluralist
struggle for influence over regulatory policy was necessarily one-sided.
While a diverse coalition of organized interests and government bodies
had long supported pesticide use, countervailing pressures remain par-

ticularly difficult to organize. And these pressures have not been consistently expressed against pesticides in America or elsewhere.
These organizational difficulties begin with the nature of the pesticide
issue. Even though every citizen is routinely exposed to many pesticides,
unlike our more directly-experienced problems, these chemical residues
are hidden from casual observation. Their invisibility and the subtlety of
long-term chronic health risks have kept the pesticide problem far from
the public mind.'"5 Meanwhile, consumer "preferences" for visibly per-

fect produce only reinforced a more insidious defilement of our food.
There was little media initiative to highlight this contradiction for urban
dwellers.' 59 Research began illuminating pesticide problems in wildlife
which attracted attention from some newspapers, but coverage generally

remained sporadic and light. Pesticide news was almost always generated
by events or exposds staged by entrepreneurs who sought to change
policy. 6o
157. E.g., price supports for milk in 1973 and then sugar in 1974 were forcibly deleted from the
Farm Bill after prices of commodities attracted the ire of consumer groups. Guth, Consumer Organizations and FederalDairy Policy, in HADWIGER & BROWNE, supra note 150; RIPLEY & FRANKLIN,
supra note 145, at 92-93. For an overview of urban-based intrusions upon other agricultural subgovemments, see MEIER, supra note 14, at 126, 131-34. Agricultural subsidies are increasingly salient
during inflationary times. Also, subsidies are procedurally vulnerable in Congress because they
require repeated affirmative legislative action (authorization and appropriation) which transfers the
veto power to any opponents (defeat is assured by a simple majority in one house, but usually much
less where delicate coalitions are involved). By comparison, persticide residues are both less visible
and less salient than price supports. Moreover, in the case of pesticides it was the agriculture
committees that held the veto advantage, since changing the status quo required new legislation
(passage requires a super majority of both houses and presidential concurrence if reform is to be
forced upon a reluctant and powerful subgovemment). Therefore, changes in pesticide law ultimately
came from extra-congressional sources-from the judicial and executive branches. See notes 18184 and accompanying text.
158. E.g., Maclntyie, supra note 128, at 232 ("the case for bureaucratic activism").
159. During the 1940s and 1950s, there was virtually no media coverage of pesticide hazards or
the associated regulatory statues. See, Whitaker, supra note 2, at 405, 426, 429, 431, 447; DUNLAP,
supra note 2, at 74.
160. See, e.g., HADWIGER, supra note 31, at 160; E. LAWLESS, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL SHOCK
276 (1977).

Summer 19871

PESTICIDES IN AMERICA

In addition to being inherently unlikely to elicit sustained public attention, pesticides illustrate a more general policy dilemma known as the
public goods (or bads) problem: any large assemblage of people seeking
some public good, a widely-diffused and collectively-shared amenity,
such as the protection of human health or lower income taxes, are at a
considerable disadvantage vis-a-vis smaller, economically-motivated groups
when it comes to organizing for voluntary action in their common interest. 6 ' Among the factors that undermine effective mobilization by large
groups are the high costs of creating, and maintaining, large organizations.
Similarly, where public goods are predominant among organizational
goals, the free-rider phenomenon discourages participation because any
public good secured by group action is available to everyone regardless
of whether they contributed to its attainment.
The organizations supporting pesticide use were not immune from these
problems. 62
' For example, farmers share a collective interest in conserving
insecticide effectiveness yet remain unable to organize to slow the onset
of pest resistance. 6' 3 They also had considerable difficulty organizing to
lobby government, until government itself did the job for them when it
established the cooperative extension service and marketing orders." s
With sufficient time, economic concentration and government encouragement, organizing became easier. The pesticide industry was also at
one time a fragmented jumble of small entrepreneurs. 6 5 The chemical
industry, and more recently agriculture, have become less numerous and
economically more concentrated and corporate. From around WWII, relatively focused economic interests in agriculture have been capable of
coordinated lobbying by a resilient, if diverse and decentralized, farm
sector. The farm sector included participants such as state departments
of agriculture, the Farm Bureau, various commodity organizations, landgrant colleges, the National Agricultural Chemical Association, and the
food processing and marketing chains. They certainly do not agree on
every detail of agricultural policy but they soon become a formidable
coalition when pesticide use is challenged. "6
In stark contrast to this effective pro-pesticide representation, groups
161. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 35; R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); A. MCFARLAND,
PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBIFS (1976); Mitchell, National EnvironmentalLobbies and the ApparentIllogic
of Collective Action, COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING: APPLICATIONS FROM PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 89

(C. Russell ed. 1979); Walker, The Origins& Maintenanceof Interest Groups in America, 77 AMER.
POL. SCi. REV. 390 (1983).
162. E.g., OLSON, supra note 35, at 145-46.
163. See note 82 and accompanying text.
164. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
165. Supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
166. See notes 32, 146 and accompanying text; Rowland & Dubnick, Decentralizationof Agriculture, FOOD POLICY AND FARM PROGRAMS 212 (D. Hadwiger & R. Talbot eds. 1982); Maclntyre,
supra note 128.
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seeking pesticide reform became viable and politically aggressive only
in the late 1960s. 67 Their relatively slow appearance, lack of an economic
base, and continuing difficulties with survival, as well as public apathy
over pesticides, have delayed and weakened the potential changes that
otherwise might have been imposed on pesticide use.
Absent public concern and until recently, effective citizen groups, the
impetus for pesticide reforms has depended largely upon the initiative of
private crusaders such as Rachel Carson, and the civic-mindedness of
non-elected officials. And due to the subgovernment's tight control over
the legislative agenda, virtually the only strategy left to reformers was
to create newsworthy incidents in the hope of generating enough public
concern to force elected officials from outside the pesticide power triangle
into this closed arena. For example, the possible health impacts of synthetic pesticide residues were first brought to national attention early in
November 1959 when, without advising USDA, the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare (FDA's superior) announced that some cranberries
were contaminated with a herbicide which gave rats cancer. The suspect
berries were withheld from market but the spectre of cancer prompted
many consumers to forego their traditional Thanksgiving accoutrement. "'
Then in the summer of 1962 Carson dropped her bombshell: 69 Silent
Spring was the first plainly-written indictment of a technology previously
considered humanity's salvation. Coincidentally, Senator Kefauver made
a dramatic media event of America's narrowly-averted thalidomide tragedy thereby circumventing congressional hostility and presidential indifference toward drug safety legislation. " Notwithstanding that remarkable
demonstration of the potential for consumer politics, pesticide hazards
failed to develop the popular appeal of drug safety issues. Carson's charges
were reviewed and cautiously vindicated by the President's Science Advisory Committee which made sweeping recommendations to President
Kennedy, who took no concerted actions."' He had no desire to annoy
Southern democrats whose support was essential to making legislative
167. For discussion of how environmental groups have surmounted the hurdles to successful
collective action, see Mitchell, supra note 161.
168. See, e.g., Blodgett, supra note 2, at 211-22; DUNLAP, supra note 2, at 107-8.
169. DUNLAP, supra note 2, at 97-102.
170. See, e.g., Id., at 104-105; GRAHAM, supra note 75, at 61; NADEL, supra note 144, at 12130; Quirk, Food and Drug Administration in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (J. Wilson ed. 1980).
Media events about deleterious effects of thalidomide were important because the safety of pharmaceutical drugs and pesticide residues are of similar concern to segments of the public, they attract
the attention of the same citizen organizations, and these issues raise similar policy dilemmas. The
contemporaneous, though accidental, appearance of the thalidomide scare and Silent Spring had a
synergistic impact on the emergence of a consumers' lobby.
171. See, Blodgett, supra note 2, at 216-17; DUNLAP, supra note 2, at 113-16; PRIMACK AND
VON HIPPEL, supra note 75, at 43-45.
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progress on his social priorities. 172 Moreover, although the debate over
pesticide risks was no longer a closed, and strictly technical affair, public
attention soon waned when civil rights, JFK's assassination, the Great
Society, and then Vietnam crowded onto the public agenda. 173 However,
Carson had planted a seed but it did not germinate until seven years later
when DDT was implicated as cancer producing.
Pesticides, notably the adverse impacts of DDT and the Agent Orange
herbicides, 174 regained national headlines in 1969 as a secondary concern
within the popular environmental movement. Instead of visible pollution
incidents, it was a rapid succession of initiatives by outsiders that challenged the pesticide subgovernment. In that year the National Cancer
Institute announced that several pesticides including DDT caused cancer

in mice (thus shifting the existing emphasis on wildlife impacts to focus
debate squarely upon human health for the first time); the FDA seized
large quantities of DDT-contaminated salmon; the General Accounting
Office issued two devasting reports on pesticide policy; a non-agriculture
House subcommittee held oversight hearings and then released its scathing
report; a private group called the Environmental Defense Fund attained
considerable publicity in its Wisconsin trial against DDT;'" several states
banned or restricted use of the chemical; and the Secretary of Health,
Education & Welfare's [HEW] Commission on Pesticides recommended
phasing out all non-essential uses of DDT within two years. 76 The USDA
responded deviously to these pressures against DDT. It announced cancellations of almost all uses of DDT but quietly retained the registration
for cotton accounting for two-thirds of use. 77 Try as they might, the few
policy entrepreneurs focusing on pesticides could dislodge neither the
172. See, e.g., Hadwiger, Freeman and the Poor, 45 AGRICULTURAL HISTORY 1, 22-23 (1971);
OF MEDICARE (1970); G. ORPIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN
EDUCATION (1969); J. SUNDQUIST, POLMCS AND POLICY (1968).
173. E.g., Blodgett, supra note 2; HADWIGER, supra note 31, at 160.
174. Agent Orange was the name given to a 50-50 mixture of 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D used by the
U.S. forces in Vietnam as a defoliant to reduce ground cover for enemy troops. These two phenoxy
herbicides have been used extensively in U.S. agriculture since WWII. Their ubiquitous contaminant,
dioxin, was found to cause birth defects in laboratory animals at extremely low doses. For a brief
introduction to the controversy surrounding dioxin and the use of these herbicides, see Rushefsky,
supra note 177, at 676-82.
175. See, DUNLAP, supra note 2, at 129-76; GRAHAM supra note 75, at 224-30.
176. On the sequence of events, that preceded the ban on DDT, see Blodgett, supra note 2;
Battista, supra note 63; DUNLAP, supra note 2; GRAHAM, supra note 75; PRIMACK & VON HIPPEL,
supra note 75, at 128-42; WELLEORD, supra note 4.
177. For detail on the USDA "sham ban" of DDT, see PRIMACK & VON HIPPEL, supra note 75, at
133-35; WELLFORD, supra note 4, at 331-39. Because of the pest resistance associated with heavy
DDT use in the past, its use on cotton crops declined rapidly during the late 1960s and early 1970s,
even though its price was extremely low (17 cents per pound). What concerned the subgovernment
most was the prospect that an outright ban on DDT might establish an undesirable precedent -the
"domino theory" of rapid and successive restrictions on vital chemical technology.
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USDA nor its congressional sovereigns. Even with these considerable
efforts, public opinion reflected only the socially-conspicuous environmental problems-basically air and water pollution. So, although public
concern for environmental quality reached unprecedented levels, within
that overall movement, pesticide hazards remained a stepchild seemingly
unable to penetrate the pesticide subgovernment's defenses.' 78 Thus, agricultural committees could continue vetoing reform legislation, at a time
when the White House and Congress were otherwise competing for credit
over the more conspicuous environmental issues.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM
Without making an apology for the status quo, by successively placing
ourselves in others' shoes, seemingly irrational actions can be seen as
logical outcomes of repeated interactions within a complex and changing
system. Examining the pesticide situation in the preceding manner illuminates the historical causes of our readiness to embrace pesticide technology and provides an overview of the obstacles confronting critics as
the 1960s drew to a close. It also suggests avenues through which reform
might succeed, as well as the hurdles that policy innovations must continue to surmount even after reforms have been set in place.
Many of the relationships discussed in this paper are depicted in Table
1. Rather than chronology, the emphasis in that schematic summary is
on exploring causal connections. Down the left-hand side of the table are
the proximate causes of agriculture's heavy dependence on pesticide technology (the dependent variable). In the right column are the exogenous
factors and second-order variables underlying the more proximate causes
to the left. No single factor provides a sufficient explanation; instead it
was their combined impact that facilitated the rapid growth of pesticide
use in food production. As chemical pest suppression technology became
available its use was essentially a fait accompli, and once established,
there was tremendous inertia favoring its continuation.
Several important factors contributing to pesticide use lay outside the
agricultural system and were therefore largely beyond the control of
participants. These factors included nuisance law, patent law, the Constitutional design, legislative fragmentation and malapportionment, world
wars, The Great Depression, climatic variation, cheap energy, urbani178. Maclntyre, supra note 128. The few opinion surveys that actually probed public attitudes
on pesticides during the early 1970s revealed an increasing, but very modest concern, as contrasted
with the more conspicuous (and more frequently polled) environmental problems of air and water
pollution. See James McEvoy Ill, The American Public Concern with the Environment: A Study of
Public Opinion, Institute of Governmental Affairs, Univ. of California at Davis, Davis, CA (1971).
J. VILADAS, CO., PEOPLE AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT (survey contracted by U.S. EPA, 1973) (available
from National Technical Information Service).
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zation, the industrial revolution, continuing technical innovation and inelastic demand for food. The myriad implications of each of these exogenous
factors further shaped events.
There are numerous causes of pesticide use which, although within
society's grasp to change, have essentially remained immutable under
relatively fixed conditions of American political culture and market economy. For example, competition within the food marketing industries
inadvertently promotes pesticide use. Similarly, the central features of
twentieth-century agriculture predisposed it to pesticide use. As laborshort entrepreneurs, farmers compete by borrowing capital which they
invest to increase output while reducing their unit costs of production.
This individualistic, free enterprise aspect led to collective overproduction
which, because of the inelastic demand for food, virtually compelled
farmers to adopt new agricultural technologies (including pesticides) which
in turn only intensified economic difficulties for most of them (and our
dependence on technology). Nor is it easy, or wholly desirable, to control
overproduction in highly competitive farming. 79 For some new farm
technologies, development fell within government's bailiwick, but much
of it was undertaken by private enterprise (mechanical, chemical, some
biological). Hence the enormous cultural and legal presumption favoring
the development and the use of pesticides. Accidents of historical timing
also intervened with the unavoidable consequence of encouraging our
commitment to chemical approaches. For example, WWII disrupted public-sector research on bio-control just as effective and apparently safe
chemicals became available.
Furthermore, several intrinsic qualities of second-generation pesticide
technology encouraged use: initial cost-effectiveness and subsequent biological addictions; the common pool resource feature of pest susceptibility invites collective over-exploitation by risk-averse individuals;
environmental and health consequences occurred off the farm and long
after introduction; and residues were invisible to casual observation by
otherwise preoccupied consumers. Likewise, we could not seriously expect pesticide manufacturers to produce selective, narrowly-applicable
chemicals unless the crop-pest affected is economically significant.
The course of events portrayed here evokes images of a Greek tragedy.
This is not to suggest their unfolding was wholly predetermined, or that
chance, ignorance, and deliberate obstruction played no part. Indeed,
reform might have occurred sooner if the pesticide subgovernment had
179. E.g., since WWII, agricultural surpluses have been an important source of humanitarian aid
abroad. Since the 1973 Oil Embargo, the federal government has encouraged farm production for
export to help reduce the U.S. trade deficit. The developed world has adopted a similar strategy for
farm exports, which has led to unmarketable surpluses, domestic farm crises and the prospect of a
trans-Atlantic trade war.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

not cooperatively resisted its critics. Such conspiracy, however, was only
one cause of delay, and a more proximate one at that. While we must
acknowledge the inertia contributed by the subgovernment's blockage, it
is also important that we not overestimate the significance of conspiratorial
elements because they do not provide a sufficient explanation of our
dependence on pesticides. As Sowell" observes, "Where intention does
exist among the individuals involved in a systemic process, that does not
mean that their intentions determine the outcome."
An important conclusion of this paper is that the pesticide "conspiracy"
was effective only to the extent that it coincided with, and reinforced
numerous, more fundamental reasons. As suggested above these factors
included the law of nuisance, the invisibility and uncertainty of pesticide
risks, the public's apathy and preference for unblemished food, the late
appearance of countervailing pressure groups, and of course, the susceptibility of Congress to pre-emptive vetoes whose reversal requires extraordinary majorities. But, starting in the late 1960s, actors from outside
the pesticide subgovernment began seeking avenues around some of these
obstacles. An important consequence of the subgovernment's blockage,
and sparse expressions of public concern was that the agriculture committees were eventually circumvented by policy innovations from institutions outside the legislature: first, at the hands of a court; then in an
executive re-organization, and ultimately by new administrators.
In response to litigation from EDF, a federal judge completely reversed
the USDA's interpretation of the pesticide statute by granting standing to
citizens' groups and by shifting the burden of proof onto the manufacturer
(1970-1971).181 Concurrently President Nixon transferred the pesticide
jurisdiction away from the USDA'into an Environmental Protection Agency
in response to electoral competition over conspicuous air and water pollution problems (late 1970). New administrators were appointed who
turned out to have responsive attitudes, different training, and a broader
clientele. Consequently one partner in the original subgovernment had
been drastically altered and the statute had been freshly reinterpreted. '
The agriculture committees sought to regain their hegemony while
amending FIFRA in 1972, but the result largely ratified the changes
imposed earlier by judicial and executive outsiders. A number of new
regulatory powers were delegated but the agriculture committees simultaneously provided themselves (and thus pesticide interests) with additional opportunities to intervene.' 3 EPA administrators, with little support,
180. T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 151 (1980). Cf. G. MOOME &R.

STUDDERT-KENNEDY,

OPINIONS, PUBLIC AND PRESSURE GROUPS 71 (1970).

181. Maclntyre, supra note 127.
182. Maclntyre, supra note 128. See also, Macintyre, Neglected Avenues to Policy Innovation:
Regulating Pesticides in the 1970s (for publication by Princeton University Press).
183. Id.
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exerted tremendous initiative throughout the 1970s. They adopted stringent standards for pesticide registration which included a general presumption against cancer-causing chemicals. This was a significant
accomplishment, particularly with respect to applications for the registration of new chemicals. However, severe resource constraints and propesticide lobbying effectively stalled the retroactive implementation of
EPA's anti-cancer innovation. While new products faced tough standards
for the first time, little more than a handful of the 1,400 chemicals
previously licensed were banned.'"
Meanwhile, farm use of pesticides increased by more than fifty percent
during that decade of environmental regulation. Agricultural uses of herbicides increased from 207 million pounds in 1971 to 451 million pounds
in 1982. Over that same period, however, the use of insecticides declined
from 126 million pounds to 71 million pounds."' 5 Among the obvious
contributions to this declining use of insecticides were the increasing
incidence of insect resistance and technology failures, the large influx of
federal funding for IPM research following 1970, and the consequent
growth in practical applications of IPM by corporate agriculture since the
mid- 1970s. The growth in herbicide use on the other hand was sustained
by the absence of clear-cut health risks or major weed resistance problems,
by the decline in crop rotation as a weed control strategy, and by the
recent shift toward minimum-till techniques to both conserve expensive
fuel inputs and slow soil erosion. Thus the biological, economic, technological, legal and political forces that encouraged pesticide use have
all been undergoing a gradual, if incomplete and uneven, metamorphosis.
It remains to be seen how far and how rapidly the diminution in insecticide
use will proceed, how successful IPM approaches have become, and
whether herbicide use will continue to escalate.
What is clear, however, is that explanations of our shifting dependencies on pesticides have previously overestimated the impact of conspiratorial components. Likewise, the contribution of health and environment
policy reforms in reducing our addiction should not be exaggerated."' 6
184. Maclntyre, supra note 128.
185. U.S. DEPT. oF AGRICULTURE, THE PESTICIDE REvIEW (1972 through 1984).
186. Concern over the health and environmental pesticide effects has yielded reforms, to which
public interest lobbies, including the Environmental Defense Fund [EDF], have made vital contributions. But these reforms have had relatively little retroactive impact on the chemicals registered
prior to the mid-1970s. Maclntyre, supra note 128. Perhaps the greatest impact of EPA's increased
regulatory stringency in testing and registering newly developed pesticides was its substantial contribution to the rising costs of developing and registering new pesticides. These escalated pesticide
costs heightened the corporate interest in pesticides with wide marketability. Accordingly, disinterest
in "minor use" pesticides increased the political demand and the economic justification for IPM
alternatives to pesticides. Thus, the efforts of health and environmental reformers and EPA's regulatory stringency have contributed to the long-term viability of non-chemical pest suppression.
Evaluating the impact of indirect contributions such as these is difficult. PERKINS, supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
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Many of the underlying biological, economic and technological factors
are immutable, or they have their own dynamics which are not easily
influenced by reformers, or by conspirators for that matter. Meanwhile,
at the political level all of the pro-pesticide forces have persisted in the
face of mounting opposition. Indeed the agriculture committees successfully retain congressional jurisdiction and the pro-pesticide coalition grows
in number and resiliency despite its unexpected defeats in the early 1970s. "'
So, pesticide policymaking remains an arena of struggle that is subject
to unpredictable outcomes.

187. Maclntyre, supra notes 127, 128.

